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THE USE OF HYPNO-INDUCED STATEMENTS
IN CRIMINAL CASES
LAWRENCE HERMAN*
1. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE MEDICO-LEGAL
ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS
Although the phenomenon of hypnosis has been known for
centuries,' scientific research on the medico-legal aspects of hypnosis
did not begin until about 1860.2 Thereafter, in numerous studies
and monographs, consideration was given to such questions as
whether criminal acts can be perpetrated upon a hypnotized person
by the hypnotist,3 and whether a person who has manifested no
anti-social tendencies can be induced by hypnosis to commit
crimes. 4 Research was stimulated by three notable European crim-
inal cases. Two of the cases were said to have involved crimes
committed by the hypnotist. In 1865 a French court sentenced
one Castellan to 12 years imprisonment for seduction abetted by
hypnosis,' and in 1894 a German court tried one Czynski for a simi-
lar offense." The third case involved not only the defense that the
* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
' For brief surveys of the history of hypnosis, see 14 Encyclopedia Americana 604
(1950) ; 12 Encyclopedia Brittannica 23 (1958) ; Reiter, Antisocial or Criminal Acts
and Hypnosis 34 (1958); Conn, "Historical Aspects of Scientific Hypnosis," 6 J.
Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis 17 (1957); Hamm, "Hypnotism in the Far East,"
14 Medico-Legal J. 323 (1896); Ladd, "Legal Aspects of Hypnotism," 11 Yale L. 3.
173, 174 (1902).
2 Reiter, op. cit. supra note 1; Ladd, supra note 1.
3 Reiter, op. cit. supra note 1; Ladd, supra note 1, at 178.
4 Reiter, op. cit. supra note 1; Ladd, supra note 1, at 180-84.
5 Allen, "Hypnotism and its Legal Import," 12 Can. B. Rev. 80, 81 (1934) ; Ladd,
supra note 1, at 178.
6 Forel, Hypnotism and Psychotherapy 290 (1907); Allen supra note 5, at 82;
Bell, "Hypnotism and the Law," 13 Medico-Legal J. 47, 50 (1895) ; Ellinger, "The
Case of Czynski," 14 Medico-Legal J. 150 (1896). Czynski was charged -with seduc-
tion, procuring a friend to pretend that he was a clergyman and to perform a sham
marriage ceremony, and attempting to obtain money by false pretenses. Whether he
was convicted of the seduction charge is questionable. Allen, supra, states that he was
acquitted. Bell, supra, and Ellinger, supra, assume that he was convicted. In the
most recent comment on the case, it is stated that Czynski was acquitted. Bryan,
Legal Aspects of Hypnosis 170 (1962).
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crime had been induced by hypnotic suggestion but also the use of
hypnosis for investigative purposes. The defendant, Gabrielle Bom-
pard, was tried by a French court for murder. Her defense was that
she had acted under the irresistible impulse of hypnotic suggestion.
To prove the validity of her claim, she consented to be interrogated
under hypnosis. The extrajudicial experiment, conducted by the
experts Charcot and Brouardel, resulted in an advisory opinion
against her claim, and she was convicted. 7
These cases, particularly Boinpard, had an immediate impact
upon the defense -tactics of American criminal lawyers, and, from
1894 to 1915, there were a number of cases involving either the
defense of hypnotic suggestion,' or the admissibility of exculpatory
statements made under hypnosis. In addition, several cases dealt
with the alleged seduction of the hypnotized subject. 0 However,
judicial hostility was manifest," and in none of these cases did the
interjection of the hypnosis issue have any appreciable effect. The
result was that just as suddenly as the problem of hypnosis had
become important in American criminal law, so it lost its impor-
tance, and, from 1915 until 1950, there was but one reported case
dealing with any medico-legal aspect of hypnosis.'2 In the last
decade, however, probably as a result of the increased use of
7 Ladd, supra note 1, at 183, 187. See Fore!, op. cit. supra note 6, at 287. Neither
author indicates the date of the case, and I have been unable to ascertain it. However,
references to the case may be found as early as 1895. Bell, supra note 6, at 47, 50.
During the 1890's Dutch authorities proposed to use hypnosis to elicit from a murder
suspect information regarding the missing victim. However, the proposal was aban-
doned. See 23 Wash. L. Rep. 534, 535 (1895) ; 95 Law Times 500 (1893).
8 People v. Worthington, 105 Cal. 166, 38 Pac. 689 (1895). In Ladd, supra note
1, at 183, the unreported case of State v. McDonald (Kan. 1895) was said to have
involved the same problem. However, subsequent investigation demonstrated beyond
doubt that the defense of hypnosis was not raised. Bell, supra note 6, at 51-54. The
same error was made regarding the unreported case of State v. Blitz (Minn. 1895).
Compare Steele, "Hypnotism and Justice," 16 N. Am. Rev. 503 (1895), with Sudduth,
"Hynotism and Crime," 13 Medico-Legal J. 239, 241 (1895). In each instance the
alleged hypnotist was convicted of procuring another to commit murder. State v.
Gray, 55 Kan. 135, 39 Pac. 1050 (1895) ; State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 65 N.W. 63
(1895). Neither reported case contains any reference to hypnosis.
9 People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 49 Pac. 1049 (1897), 15 Medico-Legal J. 240
(1897), Annot., 40 L.R.A. 269 (1915); see Austin v. Barker, 110 App. Div. 510, 96
N.Y. Supp. 814 (1906).
10 Tyrone v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. 493, 180 S.W. 125 (1915) (seduction asserted
as provocation for homicide) ; Austin v. Barker, supra note 9 (civil action for seduc-
tion) ; State v. Donovan, 128 Iowa 44, 102 N.W. 791 (1905).
1 See People v. Ebanks, supra note 9; State v. Exum, 138 N.C. 599, 50 S.E. 283
(1905).
12 Louis v. State, 24 Ala. 120, 130 So. 904 (1930). The defendant allegedly pro-
cured property from his victim by hypnosis. His conviction for robbery was reversed
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hypnosis in medical practice, 3 the problems have again arisen, not
only in criminal cases,14 but also in several recent books" and
articles. 6
This article is written in light of the renewed interest in the
relationship between hypnosis and criminal law. However, at the
outset it should be noted that the article is limited in scope. There
will be no discussion of the use of hypnosis in the commission of
crime. Rather, this article will deal with the use of hypnosis prior
to trial as an investigative aid, the admissibility of extrajudicial
statements made under hypnosis, and the use of hypnosis during
trial as a means for eliciting testimony. The focal point for this
discussion will be the recent unreported case of State v. Nebb, 7
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of force or fear.
The case is noted in 22 J. Crim. L. 279 (1932), wherein it is suggested that the court
should have applied the doctrine of constructive force. For a complete discussion of
the case, see Note, "Hypnotism, Suggestibility and the Law," 31 Neb. L. Rev. 575,
582, 585 (1952).
In 1923 a Canadian court held inadmissible a confession apparently obtained by
hypnosis. Rex v. Booher, 4 D.L.R. 795 (Sup. Ct. Alta. 1928). The case is noted in
Allen, supra note 5, at 91. At the same page Allen notes the unreported New York
case of People v. Smith (1933) in which hypnosis was used to overcome amnesia, and
the defendant's subsequent recollection led to a pre-trial determination of insanity. In
People v. Clark, 70 Cal. App. 531, 233 Pac. 980 (1925), a murder case, it was noted
that the decedent's wife, at the defendant's suggestion, forged the decedent's signature
to a letter authorizing the defendant to open a safe deposit box. In a contemporary
account of the case it was suggested that the wife acted under the defendant's hypnotic
influence. Sloan, "Hypnotism as a Defense to Crime," 41 Medico-Legal 3. 37 (1924).
13 Schneck, "Hypnosis in Psychiatry," in Hypnosis in Modern Medicine 143 (2d
ed. 1959). The American Medical Association's approval in 1958 of the use of hypnosis
in medical practice is reported in Bryan, op. cit. supra note 6, at 33.
14 See Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959) (right to
representation by counsel includes right to be interviewed by him under hypnosis) ;
People v. Marsh, 17 Cal. App. 2d 284, 338 P.2d 495 (1959) (evidence insufficient to
establish that defendant was induced by hypnosis to escape from prison); State v.
Nebb, No. 39,540, Ohio C.P, Franklin Co., May 28, 1962 (by stipulation defendant
testified under hypnosis) ; State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950) (held
inadmissible exculpatory extra-judicial statements made by defendant under hypnosis).
In People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951), the court held that the evi-
dence did not support defendant's claim that his confession was induced by hypnosis.
Ultimately the conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the
confession was involuntary. The opinion suggests that hypnosis was involved. Leyra
v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
15 Bryan, op. cit. supra note 6; Donnelly, Goldstein & Schwartz, Criminal Law
556-58 (1962) ; Paulsen & Kadish, Criminal Law and its Processes 217-18 (1962) ;
Reiter, op. cit. supra note 1; Williams, Criminal Law, The General Part §256 (2d ed.
1961).
16 Levy, "Hypnosis and Legal Immutability," 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 333
(1955) ; Note, "Hypnotism and the Law," 14 Vand. L. Rev. 1509 (1961).
17 Supra note 14.
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apparently the first American case in which an accused has testified
under hypnotic influence.
II. STATE V. NEBB, A LANDMARK?
A. The Basic Facts.'
Arthur Nebb was estranged from his wife, Bernice. On several
occasions, prior to September 14, 1961, Bernice had sued for divorce,
but the suits had been voluntarily dismissed. On September 14,
1961, a contested divorce action was pending, and Arthur was living
with friends, the Olivers. The Nebb home was occupied by Bernice
and the Nebb's daughter, Camelia. Camelia's fiance, Nelson Stepp,
lived across the street. The deceased, Estel Stepp, Nelson's cousin,
resided in the Stepp home.
On September 14, 1961, in the early evening, Nelson telephoned
Camelia and was invited to visit her. At Nelson's request, the
invitation was extended to Estel, and he accepted. Shortly there-
after, the Stepps arrived and random conversation ensued. Bernice
was present. She and Estel knew one another. On at least two
occasions the Stepp family, Bernice, and Camelia were together,
once for a picnic and once at a drive-in movie. Shortly after the
Stepps arrived, Nelson and Camelia went to a grocery store. They
were gone for about 15 to 30 minutes. Bernice and Estel remained
in the house. With them were two wards of the State of Ohio who
were being cared for by Mrs. Nebb. One of the wards was an infant;
the other was a deaf-mute. As Nelson and Camelia departed,
Arthur Nebb arrived, driving Oliver's automobile. Nelson and
Camelia did not see Arthur. As Arthur walked to the porch, he
looked through a window and saw Bernice and Estel. They were
(he claimed) in a compromising position. He immediately returned
to the Olivers' house. With great excitement he said that his wife
was in bed with another man. He asked Mrs. Oliver to telephone
his attorney, and he asked Mr. Oliver to return with him to the
Nebb house to be a witness. He said either "I am going to kill
them" or "I ought to kill them." Then he climbed into his truck
and drove away. About five minutes later, Mr. Oliver left for the
Nebb house. When he arrived, a crowd was already there. Arthur
had shot Bernice and Estel with a gun that he kept under the seat
of his truck. Bernice sustained multiple, but non-fatal, wounds.
Estel, shot through the eye, died en route to the hospital. Arthur
was indicted for first-degree murder.
At the trial, Bernice was the prosecution's key witness. How-
ever, under an interpretation of the spousal privilege, she was per-
18 With some exceptions, footnote references to pages in the transcript are omitted.
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mitted to testify as to Arthur's acts occurring in the presence of
third persons, but was not permitted to testify as to what occurred
between her and Estel. She testified that Arthur had previously
threatened to shoot her. Regarding the fatal shooting, she testified
that Arthur entered the house, gun drawn, shortly after Nelson
and Camelia returned; that she (Bernice) and Estel were then
seated at opposite ends of a sofa; that Arthur stated, " I told you
I'd get even with you, you bitch, and this is it"; that Arthur raised
the gun over her head and fired at Estel; and that Arthur then
fired repeatedly at her, stopping only when Camelia screamed.
The first five witnesses for the defense testified either that
Arthur had a good work record or that he had a good reputation
for truth. Arthur was then called to testify. After relating much
information about his background, his work, a serious injury suf-
fered at work, and domestic discord, he recounted his first visit
to the Nebb house on the evening in question up to, but not includ-
ing, what transpired between Bernice and Estel. Then, by agree-
ment of counsel, Arthur's testimony was halted, the jury was
temporarily excused, and Dr. T. R. Huxtable, Jr., a psychiatrist
employed by the State of Ohio, was qualified by the defense as an
expert witness on hypnosis.
B. Dr. Huxtable's Testimony.
1. The Uses of Hypnosis in Medicine.
Dr. Huxtable testified that the use of hypnosis is now estab-
lished and accepted in medicine and psychiatry. Hypnosis has been
used to induce analgesia for dental and obstetric operations. It
has also been used to overcome a "therapeutic block" and retro-
grade amnesia. 9
2. The Reliability of Statements Made Under Hypnosis.
Dr. Huxtable emphatically asserted, in direct and cross-
examination, that statements made under hypnosis are reliable.
He characterized hypnosis as "the royal road to the unconscious." 20
Answering a question regarding the subject's control of his state-
ments under hypnosis, he said:
[There is] usually none; the statements you get usually are fact.
I would have to qualify that, in certain types of mental disorders,
this may not be true, but generally speaking, using the hypnosis or
pentothal or amytal, or what is commonly referred to as "truth
serums," you get the facts. 21
19 Record, pp. 491-93.
20 Id. at 492.
21 Id. at 494-95.
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Dr. Huxtable admitted that a hypnotized person is easily
subject to suggestion (post-hypnotic suggestion, for example) ,22
but not when he is being interrogated under hypnosis. He stated
that it would be impossible for the subject to convince himself of
the validity of a false factual premise and to maintain the con-
viction under hypnosis. 23 In his least affirmative statement, he
conceded the possibility that the subject might lie, but he denied
the probability. 24 To his statements in support of hypno-induced
testimony, he added the qualifications that the person hypnotized
must be a good subject for hypnosis; 25 that he must be in a true
hypnotic trance; 2' and that techniques of hypnosis might prove
ineffective with a psychopathic subject.27
3. Comparative Reliability of Statements Made Under
Hypnosis and Statements Induced by Narcosis.
At several points in this testimony, Dr. Huxtable compared the
reliability of statements made under hypnosis and statements
induced by drugs such as sodium pentothal and sodium amytal.
One example is in the quotation above. Dr. Huxtable was quite
affirmative in his opinion of the reliability of both methods. Indeed,
he asserted that under either method a good subject would respond
truthfully even though he was ordinarily a pathological liar.2"
4. Pre-Trial Relationship Between Huxtable and Nebb.
Dr. Huxtable testified that he had hypnotized and interrogated
Arthur Nebb two or three times prior to the trial. He asserted that
Nebb was a good subject. Finally, without objection, he stated,
"It's my opinion that the statements he made to me on the two
occasions that I saw him in a hypnotic trance were factual." 2
C. The Hypnosis of Arthur Nebb.
Dr. Huxtable assured the prosecuting attorney that he would
not proceed unless he was completely satisfied that the defendant
was in a hypnotic trance. Thereafter, out of the jury's presence,
Nebb was hypnotized and was subjected to two tests to determine
the depth of the trance. First, Nebb was told that his arm would be
22 Id. at 495.
23 Id. at 499.
24 Id. at 507.
25 Id. at 502.
28 Id. at 501.
27 Id. at 498.
28 Id. at 497.
29 Id. at 496.
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numb.30 He accepted the suggestion and did not respond when
the prosecuting attorney pricked his arm with a knife. Then Nebb
was told to write his name both as he customarily does and as he
did when he was in the fifth grade. Although the result of this test
was not described for the record, it appears that the fifth-grade
handwriting was significantly different from the adult handwriting,
and that the fifth-grade signature contained an error in spelling.31
D. Arthur Nebb's Testimony Under Hypnosis.
In answer to questions put to him by the prosecuting attor-
ney, Nebb stated that when he first arrived at the Nebb house,
he saw Camelia and Nelson leave; that he did not try to avoid
being seen by them; that a pre-trial statement to the contrary was
not true and was made under confusion; that as he approached the
house, he looked through a window and saw a hand reach for
Bernice's outstretched hand; that Bernice kissed the man, took
his hand, and walked with him into the dining room; that he
(Nebb) then walked to the bedroom window; that Bernice and
the man disrobed; that he (Nebb) wanted someone else to witness
the scene; that he returned to the Olivers' house, asked Mrs. Oliver
to call his attorney, and asked Mr. Oliver to follow him; and that he
left the Olivers' house in his truck. When asked about his statement
to the Olivers, he said, "I said, 'I got them both.'" When pressed
about his answer, he admitted that he said "I ought to kill them
both." Nebb testified further that he armed himself in order to
force Bernice and the man to remain as he found them; that when
he approached the house, he saw that Bernice and the man were not
in bed; that he entered the house and was surprised to see Camelia
and Nelson there; and that when he entered the house he had the
gun in his right hand. Thereafter, he testified as follows:
Nebb: Went in the house-
Huxtable: Look in the direction you pointed it. Show us how
you pointed it.
Nebb: Like this. Camelia and Clyde [Mrs. Nebb's son, adopted
by Nebb when he married Mrs. Nebb] were over there.
Allison (prosecuting attorney): Camelia and who?
Nebb: Nelson, Nelson, Nelson.
Allison: Now,-
Nebb: Nelson and Camelia. Nelson-
Huxtable: Where was Estel?
Nebb: Estel? I don't know no Estel. I seen Nelson go for the
living room [dining room?] and Bernice hollered, "What's the
30 Id. at 509.
3' Id. at 511-12.
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matter ?" and Camelia jumped up, and just then Bernice jumped
and grabbed me and the gun fired.
Huxtable: Stand up. You are all right.
Nebb: Fired.
Huxtable: You are all right.
Nebb: And I fired again.
Huxtable: How many times?
Nebb: Again.
Huxtable: What you see here is a reliving of the emotional
reaction at the time this took place.
Nebb: She went down.
Huxtable: What did you do? How many times did you fire?
How many times? How many times?
Nebb: Five. Five. Five.
Huxtable: You are all right. Stand up. You want to sit down
on the chair? Open your eyes. Get in the chair again. Sit down.
What did you do then?
Nebb: I thought she was dead. Camelia kept hollering at me
and everything drained out of me.
Huxtable: Arthur, when you drove back from Jess Oliver's in
that car [truck?] were you going back to kill Bernice?
Nebb: No, I just wanted to get back there and see who he was.
Allison: Were you going to kill him, Arthur?
Nebb: No, I didn't want to hurt anybody, I just wanted to- 3 2
The prosecuting attorney then questioned Nebb about a pre-
trial statement in which Nebb apparently admitted that he intended
to kill Bernice. Nebb admitted making the statement and ex-
plained that if Camelia had not yelled, he would have killed
Bernice because "after the gun went off I couldn't stop myself."
In answer to a series of questions, Nebb insisted that he dropped
the gun on the living room floor before he left the house. Finally,
Nebb denied, as he had previously in his testimony, that he saw
any man in the living room other than Nelson when he returned
to the house. Nebb was then brought out of hypnosis, complained
of a headache, and was briefly re-hypnotized for purpose of inducing
analgesia. A recess was then declared.
E. Conclusion of the Trial.
When the trial was resumed, the prosecuting attorney an-
nounced that he desired to amend the indictment and to proceed
on a charge of manslaughter. Moreover, he announced that he had
filed an information charging Nebb with aggravated assault. Nebb
waived indictment and pleaded guilty to both offenses. Thereafter,
Nebb received concurrent sentences to imprisonment.
32 Id. at 521-23.
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F. Some Observations About the Nebb Case.
As might be expected, the Nebb case was commented upon in
the newspapers.3 3 Dr. Huxtable defended the use of hypnotism in
the Nebb case. 4 An unnamed psychiatrist questioned the reliability
of statements made under hypnosis and narcosis.35 Further, he
noted that Nebb had testified in the past tense which is "not ordi-
narily the way a hypnotized person talks." 36 Although the case
was hailed as a "courtroom first," 37 the characterization was inaccu-
rate. The "first" was one of form rather than substance. Dr.
Huxtable's testimony, the hypnotizing of Arthur Nebb, and Nebb's
subsequent testimony were effected without objection by the prose-
cution. Moreover, the entire proceedings were conducted out of the
presence of the jury. There was no judicial determination of the
admissibility of Dr. Huxtable's statement that Nebb's pre-trial
statements under hypnosis were factual; there was no judicial
determination of the admissibility of the experiment; and there
was no judicial determination of the reliability of statements made
under hypnosis. Nevertheless, the case is important because it calls
to the attention of the bar the possible forensic application of
hypnosis. Further, it suggests many evidentiary problems already
alluded to in this article. These problems will now be discussed.
III. HYPNOSIS AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE,
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Introduction.
It has already been noted that the number of American cases
involving problems of hypnosis reached a peak between 1894 and
1915 and declined markedly thereafter. 8 In the 1920's hypnotism
was all but ignored as a device for ascertaining truth and detecting
deception.39 But other devices were in an experimental stage, and
their continued development posed difficult problems particularly in
criminal cases. These other devices, the so-called "lie-detector" and
"truth serum," have now given rise to a considerable body of case
33 Columbus Dispatch, June 17, 1962, §A, p. 33, col. 1; p. 35, < ,f. 5.
34 Id. at §A, p. 33, cols. 3-4.
35 Id. at §A, p. 33, cols. 7-8.
36 Id. at §A, p. 43, col. 1.
37 Id. at §A, p. 35, cols. 5-6.
S8 See text to notes 8, 9, and 10, supra.
39 Note, "Hypnotism, Suggestibility and the Law," 31 Neb. L. Rev. 575 n. 1
(1952).
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law 40 and comment.4' Thus, in analyzing the relatively few cases
involving hypnosis and in predicting the probable judicial treatment
of unresolved problems of hypnosis, it is necessary for purposes of
detailed comparison to include a substantial excursus involving
cases decided long after most of the hypnosis cases were decided. In
this comparison illustrative problem cases will be used.
B. The Use of Hypnosis as a Pre-Trial Investigative Aid for the
Defense.
Suppose that D, indicted for murder, neither admits nor denies
his guilt when interviewed by his attorney. Rather, D insists that
he has a retrograde alcoholic amnesia concerning the incident. The
attorney, realizing the hopelessness of attempting to prepare a
defense without D's cooperation, seeks to have D hypnotized and
to interrogate him while under the influence of hypnosis.
If D is not in pre-trial confinement and is willing to be hypno-
tized, no problem arises. But suppose that D is confined and that
the director of the confinement facility refuses to permit the experi-
ment. Does D have a legally enforceable right to be so interrogated?
An answer to this question is not to be found in the lie-detector and
truth serum cases which deal almost exclusively with the admissibil-
ity of evidence. Further, the use of the lie-detector, whether for
purposes of business security 42 or police investigation,43 presupposes
40 For a good collection of lie-detector cases, see Note, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 880
(1959). Equally good collections of truth serum cases are to be found in Dession,
Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, "Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation,"
62 Yale L.J. 313 (1953) [author hereinafter cited as Dession] ; Note, "Some Prob-
lems Relating to the Admissibility of Drug Influenced Confessions," 24 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 96 (1957) ; Comment, "Admission of Confessions and Denials Made Under the
Influence of Drugs," 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 666 (1957).
41 Regarding the lie-detector, see Arther, "The Lie Detector-Is It of Any
Value?", 24 Fed. Prob. 36 (Dec. 1960) ; Cureton, "A Consensus as to the Validity of
Polygraph Procedures," 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 728 (1953) ; Floch, "Limitations of the Lie
Detector," 40 J. Crim. L. 651 (1950) ; Forkosch, "The Lie Detector and the Courts,"
16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 202 (1939); Hardman, "Lie Detectors, Extrajudicial Investi-
gations and the Courts," 48 W. Va. L.Q. Rev. 37 (1941) ; Inbau, "Some Avoidable
Lie Detector Mistakes," 40 J. Crim. L. 791 (1950); Inbau, "Detection of Deception
Techniques Admitted as Evidence," 26 Id. 262 (1936); Silving, "Testing of the Un-
conscious in Criminal Cases," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 683 (1956); Skolnick, "Scientific
Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection," 70 Yale L.J. 694
(1961) ; Wicker, "The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence," 22 Tenn. L.
Rev. 711 (1953). Regarding truth serum, see Despres, "Legal Aspects of Drug-
Induced Statements," 14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601 (1947) ; Gleis, "In Scopolamine Veritas,"
50 J. Crim. L.,C.&P.S. 347 (1959); Macdonald, "Truth Serum," 46 Id. 259 (1955);
Moenssens, "Narcoanalysis in Law Enforcement," 52 Id. 453 (1961); Muehlberger,
"Interrogation Under Drug Influence," 42 Id. 513 (1951) ; Sheedy, "Narcointerroga-
tion of a Criminal Suspect," 50 Id. 118 (1959).
42 The lie-detector is frequently used in the periodic examination of employees of
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the consent not only of the interrogee, but also of any other person
whose consent might be required. Moreover, the lie-detector reaches
not into the unconscious," as do hypnotism and certain drugs, but
tests only physiological responses and is, therefore, without value
in overcoming amnesia.
Confronted by a lack of precedent, counsel for the defendant in
Cornell v. Superior Court 45 successfully argued that the right to
be represented by counsel included the right to be interrogated
while hypnotized for the purpose of overcoming amnesia. Quite
correctly, the Supreme Court of California rejected as irrelevant
the prosecution's argument that statements made under hypnosis
are inadmissible in evidence,46 and held that the issue concerned
discovery rather than admissibility.47 Unfortunately, the court
stated that "the use of hypnotism for the purpose desired is recog-
nized by medical authorities." 4 Arguably the court thereby at-
tached to the use of a discovery device a criterion of reliability or
efficacy. However, the efficacy of the device should be irrelevant to
discovery, and the defendant and his attorney should be permitted
to take the risk of a false lead as an alternative to no information
at all.4sa
large commercial organizations with a resulting decrease in losses attributable to em-
ployees. Such organizations may thereby be able to obtain lower premiums on insur-
ance and bonds. Note, 29 Cornell L.Q. 535, 539-40 (1944). See Arther, "The Lie-
Detector-Is It of Any Value?," 24 Fed. Prob. 36, 37-38 (Dec. 1960).
43 Regarding the extent to which the lie-detector is used in police investigative
work, see Wicker, "The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence," 22 Tenn.
L. Rev. 711 (1953) ; Note, 29 Cornell L.Q. 535, 539 (1944). For an attack upon even
the investigative use of the device, see Skolnick, "Scientific Theory and Scientific Evi-
dence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection," 70 Yale L.J. 694, 722-23 (1961).
44 Skolnick, supra note 43, at 724, criticizing Silving, "Testing of the Unconscious
in Criminal Cases," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 683, 687-89, 702 (1956).
45 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959), noted in Levy, "Hypnosis and the Law,"
41 Chi. B. Rec. 243 (1960); 11 Hastings LJ. 72 (1959). The action, in mandamus,
was brought by defendant's attorney. Defendant's name was Conrey.
46 The problem of admissibility is discussed infra at p. 12.
47 Suppose, however, that the amnesia is overcome by hypnosis and that the sub-
ject is given a post-hypnotic suggestion to remember the events recalled under hyp-
nosis. Is his subsequent testimony admissible? There is some indication that Conrey
testified under post-hypnotic suggestion. See Mikesell, "Hypnosis in the Conrey Murder
Case," in Bryan, op. cit. supra note 6, at 57-64.
48 52 Cal. 2d at 103, 338 P.2d at 449.
48a In sharp contrast to the Cornell case is State ex rel. Sheppard v. Koblentz,
174 Ohio St. 120, 187 N.E.2d 40 (1962), in which it was held that the right to
counsel did not include the right to be interrogated under hypnosis for the purpose of
overcoming amnesia. Further, the court excluded examination by lie-detector. On the
lie-detector point the court was correct if only because the lie-detector does not test
the unconscious. See note 44, mspra. On the hypnosis point, the Sheppard case argu-
ably is distinguishable from the Cornell case in that Cornell involved pretrial proceed-
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C. Admissibility, Over Objection, of Exculpatory Statements
Made Under Hypnosis.
1. The Rule of Inadmissibility in Hypnosis Cases.
Suppose that D, indicted for murder, " claims the defense of
alibi. His attorney is unable to find any corroborating witness,
and, to test D's story, has D hypnotized by a well-qualified medical
hypnotist and then interrogates him. The interrogation is tape-
recorded. D persists in his claim of alibi. At the trial D's attorney
offers into evidence the tape recording. The recording is properly
identified and supported by proffered testimony of reliability. The
prosecution objects. Should the objection be sustained? The case-
law answer is yes.50 In People v. Ebanks,51 the court, after noting
that the trial court refused to permit the defendant's hypnotist to
testify, said briefly, "We shall not stop to argue the point, and
only add that the [trial] court was right." '2 In State v. Pusch, r1
it was observed:
No case has been cited by either party relating to the admissibility
of the evidence proffered and no case has been found. We think
that the evidence was clearly inadmissible and that no error was
committed in sustaining the objection. 4
These two cases comprise the sum of American case law on the
question of the admissibility of exculpatory statements made
under hypnosis.
2. The Rule of Inadmissibility in Lie-Detector and
Truth Serum Cases.
In holding that statements made under hypnosis are inadmissi-
ble over objection, the Bbanks and Pnsck cases are in accord with
the lie-detector and truth serum cases. Regarding the lie-detector,
it has been held with but a single exception " that exculpatory
ings and Sheppard involved post-appellate proceedings. However, the court did not
make this distinction. Indeed, although the Cornell case was known to the court, see
Brief for Relator, p. 4, the court, in a shocking opinion, did not even cite Cornell.
49 The offense of murder has not been selected for dramatic effect. In a sub-
stantial majority of the cases involving the scientific devices under consideration, the
defendant was charged with murder.
50 People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 49 Pac. 1049 (1897) ; State v. Pusch, 77 N.D.
860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950).
51 Supra note 50.
52 117 Cal. at 666, 49 Pac. at 1053.
53 Supra note 50.
54 77 N.D. at 888,46 N.W.2d at 522.
55 People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Co. Ct. 1938). The vitality of
the Kenny case was sapped in People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E2d 31 (1938),
when the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to permit the
defendant to take a lie-detector test.
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interpretations are inadmissible over objection.5 6 Similarly, a trial
court has been sustained in overruling a defense motion for dis-
covery of the results of a lie-detector test already administered; 7
it has been held objectionable for defense counsel to ask in examina-
tion whether the defendant took a lie-detector test; s and it has
been held objectionable for the defendant to testify that he is willing
to take a lie-detector test,59 whether the test is to be administered
in court 60 or out of court.6' Regarding truth serum, it has been
held without exception that exculpatory statements are inadmissi-
ble,62 and the rule of inadmissibility embraces testimony that the
defendant was interrogated under narcosis, 3 an offer to testify
under narcosis, 4 statements of willingness to be interrogated out
of court under narcosis, 5 and the use of narco-induced statements
in support of a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. 6
3. Reasons for the Rule of Inadmissibility-The Requirements
of General Scientific Acceptance and Reliability.
Although the Ebanks and Pusck cases are supported by analo-
gous decisions, the inquiry is not over. Is the rule of inadmissibility
a reasonable one? What purpose does it serve? How does it fit into
the law of evidence? In answering these questions no help can be
derived from such statements as "the court was right" and "the
56 Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ; People v. Becker, 300
Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593
(1949) ; State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1951) ; Placker v. State, 171
Tex. Crim. 406, 350 S.W.2d 546 (1961); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W.
314 (1933).
57 State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101, 370 P.2d 261 (1962).
58 Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, cert. denied, 342 U.S.
898 (1951).
59 Ibid.
60 Frye v. United States, supra note 56; Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa.
149, 125 A.2d 442 (1956).
01 People v. Porter, 99 Cal. App. 2d 506, 222 P.2d 151 (1950) ; People v. Forte,
supra note 55; State v. Pusch, supra note 56.
02 People v. McNichol, 100 Cal. App. 2d 544, 224 '.2d 21 (1950); Dugan v.
Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1960). State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243
P.2d 325 (1952) ; State v. Hudson, 289 S.W. 920 (Mo. 1926) ; Orange v. Common-
wealth, 191 Va. 423, 61 S.E2d 267 (1950).
03 Henderson v. State, supra note 58.
64 People v. McCracken, 39 Cal. 2d 336, 246 P2d 913 (1952). As an alternate
ground for decision, the court held that if narco-induced testimony is admissible, ad-
missibility is a matter for the trial court's discretion.
65 People v. Cullen, 37 Cal. 2d 614, 234 P.2d 1 (1951) ; Henderson v. State, supra
note 58.
06 United States v. Bourchier, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 15, 17 C.M.R. 15 (1954).
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evidence was clearly inadmissible," statements unaccompanied by
analysis. But a basis for analysis is available. It is a general rule
of evidence that a scientific experiment cannot be made part of the
process of proof unless the experiment is "scientifically sound
enough to merit general approval of its reliability" 67 by those who
practice in the relevant branch of science.38 Each of these conditions
(general scientific approval, reliability) has been invoked to support
the rule of inadmissibility in the lie-detector 69 and truth serum 70
cases. The condition of general scientific approval assumes some
substantial use of the device or technique in the relevant science,
and this assumption has created a stumbling block particularly
with reference to the lie-detector. Perhaps because the device has
from its inception been associated with criminal interrogation, 71
perhaps because the device is too "adventurous" for academicians, 72
those in the relevant sciences of psychology and physiology have
not used the device experimentally, and, therefore, are in no position
to accept it. 7 3 This matter aside, the principal problem pertaining
not only to the lie-detector but also to truth serum is that of
reliability.74
67 George, "Scientific Investigation and Defendants' Rights," 57 Mich. L. Rev. 37,
39 (1958).
68 Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof §220, at 450 (3d ed. 1937).
69 Lack of general scientific approval: Frye v. United States, supra note 56;
People v. Becker, supra note 56; People v. Forte, supra note 55; Henderson v. State,
supra, note 58. Inbau and Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 130 (3d ed.
1953) [author hereafter cited as Inbau]. Lack of reliability: People v. Porter, supra
note 61; People v. Becker, supra note 56; Boeche v. State, supra note 56; People v.
Forte, supra note 55; State v. Pusch, supra note 56; Henderson v. State, supra note
58, State v. Bohner, supra note 56. Bear in mind that these cases and the case in
note 70, infra, deal with exculpatory results only.
70 Lack of general scientific acceptance: Dugan v. Commonwealth, supra note 62;
State v. Lindemuth, supra note 62; Henderson v. State, supra note 58. Lack of re-
liability: United States v. Bourchier, supra note 66; Dugan v. Commonwealth, supra
note 62; State v. Hudson, supra note 62; State v. Lindemuth, supra note 62; Hender-
son v. State, supra note 58; Orange v. Commonwealth, supra note 62.
71 Inbau, op. cit. supra note 69, at 2-5.
72 Id. at 131.
73 Id. at 130; Cureton, "A Consensus as to the Validity of Polygraph Procedures,"
22 Tenn. L. Rev. 728, 740 (1953). Dr. Cureton's article contains a questionnaire sub-
mitted to lie-detector operators, observers, and experimenters. The answers indicate
a direct relationship between forensic, as opposed to experimental, use and the degree
of acceptance. Over all, the results are hardly a testimonial to scientific acceptance.
For a more sanguine opinion of the results, see Trovillo, "Scientific Proof of Credi-
bility," 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 743 (1953).
74 It may be assumed that if there is sufficient evidence of the reliability of a
scientific device or technique, general scientific acceptance will follow. Conversely,
lack of general scientific acceptance is relevant to an argument against reliability.
But it is by no means conclusive evidence of unreliability.
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4. Reliability of the Lie-Detector.
a. Some general observations.
That form of the lie-detector known as the "Reid Polygraph"
purports to record changes in the subject's blood pressure, pulse
rate, respiration, conductivity by the hands of external electric
current (psychologalvanic skin reflex), and muscular activity.75
The psychological assumption underlying the operation of the
lie-detector is that fear of detection, heightened by "key" questions,
produces physiological changes. 76 These changes, recorded graph-
ically, are interpreted by the examiner who renders an opinion that
the changes indicate either truth or deception or that they are
inconclusive. Initially, some consideration should be given to the
underlying physiological assumptions. However, most commen-
tators have avoided the matter and have concerned themselves
with other aspects of the reliability problem.77 Professor Skolnick
is a noteworthy exception. In a recent article he states:
In sum, academic psychology and psychophysiology challenge both
substantive assumptions underlying lie-detection theory: the as-
sumption of a regular relationship between lying and emotional
states, and the assumption of a regular and measurable relation-
ship between emotional change and autonomic activity.78
Whether Professor Skolnick's evidence 79 supports his conclu-
sion need not be considered herein. Suffice it to say that his evidence
does indicate difficulties in the process of measurement which diffi-
culties, in turn, affect the task of interpretation and cast some
doubt on the statistics of reliability. 0 However, hypnosis is not
a technique of measurement and interpretation, and, for purposes
of this article, the importance of Professor Skolnick's effort lies
in its approach: the isolation and consideration of criteria of
reliability."'
b. Statistics of reliability.
The foremost exponents of the use of the lie-detector as an
investigative device estimate that the lie-detector is 95 per cent
accurate if used under the most favorable conditions.
75 Inbau, op. cit. supra note 69, at 4.
76 Id. at 64.
77 See generally articles regarding the lie-detector cited in note 41, supra.
78 Supra note 43, at 703.
79 Id. at 700-02.
80 See pp. 15-16 infra for a discussion of the statistics of reliability.
81 Another criterion, that the device function properly, will not be considered in
this article.
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[I]n the examination of 100 subjects the examiner may make a
definite and accurate diagnosis as to the guilt or innocence of 95
subjects. As to 4 of the subjects the examiner may be unable to
arrive at a definite opinion as to guilt or innocence. With the 1
remaining subject the examiner may make an erroneous diagnosis
of guilt or innocence.8 2
Moreover, there is some evidence that most erroneous deter-
minations favor the lying subject.s3 These statistical assertions
have been accepted uncritically by some commentators who argue
that the lie-detector is sufficiently reliable to warrant the admissi-
bility into evidence of the examiner's conclusions."' Other com-
mentators, however, have vigorously attacked these assertions of
high reliability as based upon inadequate sampling.85 Regardless
of the adequacy of the sample, it must be admitted that the reliabil-
ity problem is complicated by the fact that the devices of verification
(subsequent confessions, convictions, acquittals) are not error-free.
In addition, it must be kept in mind that the investigations upon
which the statistics of high reliability are based were conducted
under the most favorable conditions. The absence of any of these
conditions would assuredly result in a diminution of reliability.
c. The conditions of reliability.
The conditions of reliability relate quite obviously to instru-
mentation, technique, subject, and examiner. Regarding instru-
mentation and technique, it is sufficient here to note Professor
Inbau's admonition that there is not enough standardization to
warrant an across-the-board rule of admissibility."6 But even if
standardization is eventually achieved, the subject of the test will
continue to pose problems. Any of the following factors relating
to the subject may give rise to an erroneous interpretation: (1)
extreme nervousness, (2) physical abnormality, (3) mental abnor-
mality, (4) unresponsiveness, and (5) muscular pressure or con-
trolled breathing."S Whether the subject is fit for interrogation is to
82 Inbau, op. cit. supra note 69, at 111; Arther, supra note 42, at 39.
83 Arther, supra note 42, at 39. This evidence suggests the danger of general ob-
servations about reliability. The examiner's conclusion of falsehood may be more re-
liable than his conclusion of truth.
84 Hardman, "Lie Detectors, Extrajudicial Investigations and the Courts," 48
W. Va. L.Q. Rev. 37 (1941); Note, 29 Cornell L.Q. 535 (1944).
85 Burack, "A Critical Analysis of the Theory, Method, and Limitations of the
'Lie Detector,'" 46 J. Crim. L.,C.&P.S. 414 (1955) ; Skolnick, supra note 43.
86 Inbau, op. cit. supra note 69, at 128.
s7 Id. at 65-66. See also Floch, "Limitations of the Lie Detector," 10 J. Crim. L.
651 (1950) ; Inbau, "Some Avoidable Lie-Detector Mistakes," 40 Id. 791; "Statement
of Principles Regarding Polygraph ("Lie-Detector") Examinations," 48 3. Crim.
L., C.&P.S. 568 (1958).
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be determined by the examiner and, ultimately, the problem of
reliability depends in large part on the examiner's qualifications. 88
In 1953 Professor Inbau stated:
[A]n examiner need not be a physician or a psychologist,89 but
he must be an intelligent person with a reasonably good educa-
tional background, preferably college training. He should have
an intense interest in the work itself, a good practical understand-
ing of human nature, and suitable personality traits which may
be evident from his otherwise general ability to "get along" with
people and to be well liked by his friends and associates. No
amount of training and experience will overcome the lack of these
necessary qualifications.
Many persons now functioning as lie-detector examiners do
not possess these basic qualifications. They should never have been
encouraged to embark upon such a career. Unfortunately, how-
ever, a number of established examiners have conducted schools
for trainees and have followed a practice of accepting as students
practically anyone who applied with the necessary tuition fee or
who had been selected by his own police department or govern-
mental agency to attend the school at his employer's expense.90
That the situation has not changed materially since 1953 is appar-
ent from the recent statement of a noted lie-detector examiner:
"It must be remembered that there are few truly competent
examiners." 91
All of these factors (lack of standardization in instrumentation
and technique, variations in subject, and lack of qualifications on
the part of examiners) militate against a general rule of admissibil-
ity. But suppose that each of these factors is absent in a given
case, that the machine is the most modern device in use, that the
technique meets the highest standards of competent examiners,
that the subject is fit for examination, and that the examiner is
well-qualified. Should an ad hoc rule of admissibility be adopted
if the foregoing can be proved? Professor Inbau does not argue for
88 For a complete discussion of the qualifications of an examiner, see Inbau, op.
cit. supra note 69, at 114-16. In a recent article it was concluded that, because mental
illness may affect the reliability of lie-detector results, the examiner should be trained
in the recognition of mental illness. ieckel, Brokaw, Salzberg, Wiggins, "Polygraphic
Variations in Reactivity Between Delusional, Non-Delusional, and Control Groups in a
'Crime' Setting," 53 J. Crim. L.,C.&P.S. 380 (1962).
89 Professor Skolnick states that the task of the lie-detector examiner is more
difficult than the task of a psychiatrist. The latter may be called upon to decide
whether the subject has a tendency to lie. The former must decide whether the sub-
ject is lying about a particular event. Skolnick, supra note 43, at 707. For a compari.
son of the training of a lie-detector examiner with the training of a psychiatrist, see
ibid.
90 Inbau, op. cit. supra note 69, at 114.
91 Arther, supra note 42, at 39.
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such a rule. His position, as of 1953, is summarized in the follow-
ing statement: "Until the previously estimated accuracy is gen-
erally attainable, and a much higher degree of standardization
achieved, the courts should continue to withhold judicial sanction
of lie-detector test results." 92 And, in an early case in which evi-
dence of falsehood was admitted by stipulation, the noted examiner,
Leonarde Keeler, testified that he "would not want to convict a
man on the grounds of the records alone." 93 If there is hesitation
and reluctance on the part of noted examiners, what is to be ex-
pected of the courts?
d. The Judicial approach to the problem of reliability.
It has already been stated that courts, with but one exception,
have excluded the results of lie-detector tests generally on the ground
of unreliability. What do courts mean by "unreliability"? Some
courts mean in part that there is judicial precedent for a determina-
tion of unreliability and that the precedent will be followed. 4
Other courts rest in part upon Professor Inbau's argument against
a general rule of admissibility without considering whether in the
particular case the results might be reliable. 5 The Supreme Court
of Nebraska has decried the fact that "a wholly accurate test is yet
to be reported," 96 and the Supreme Court of Michigan has refused
to sanction admissibility "until it is established that reasonable
certainty follows from such tests. . .. 97 (Emphasis added.)
Although cases can be found in which a court has expressed its
unwillingness to take the risk that the subject was unfit for examina-
tion,98 or that the examiner was incompetent,9 such cases are few
and the expressions are made without reference to the facts of the
particular case. In sum, the judicial treatment of the reliability
problem is superficial in the extreme. But several things are clear:
a particularly high standard of reliability ("wholly accurate," "rea-
sonable certainty") is required; and fears, unrelated to facts, will
carry the day.
Why should such a high standard be required? It is not
92 Inbau, op. cit. supra note 69, at 128.
93 Inbau, "Detection of Deception Technique Admitted as Evidence," 26 J. Crim.
L., C.&P.S. 262, 267 (1936).
94 State v. Arnwine, 67 N.J. Super. 483, 171 A.2d 124 (1961) ; State v. Cole, 354
Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945) ; State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
95 State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); Henderson v. State, 94
Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951).
96 Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 378, 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949).
97 People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 566, 2 N.W2d 503, 505 (1942).
98 Boeche v. State, supra note 96.
99 Henderson v. State, supra note 95.
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required of eye-witness testimony identifying the accused as the
perpetrator of a crime even though there have been many cases in
which the testimony was accepted by the jury and was later proved
to be unreliable. 00 Indeed, even if it is shown at the trial that a
witness has testified falsely to certain matters, the jury is not
required to disregard all of his testimony.' The maxim falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus relates to weight rather than admissibility 0 2
On the other hand, it may be argued that it is within the com-
mon experience of jurors to evaluate and act upon statements made
to them by others, but that it is outside their common experience
to evaluate the reliability of a scientific device. Thus, runs the
argument, if the results of a lie-detector test were admitted, the
jury would accept them uncritically. As one commentator has
observed:
Underlying [the requirement of high reliability] is the fear that
the jury will accept a scientific device as absolutely reliable, with-
out consideration of any possible percentage of error in its opera-
tion which may have impact on the fact issues which they are
to decide.'03
This observation is, of course, speculative, and the available
empirical evidence is hardly conclusive. In an unreported 1935
Wisconsin case, Leonarde Keeler was permitted by stipulation to
testify that he had given a lie-detector test to the defendants and
that the results indicated falsehood. The defendants were convicted,
and thereafter each juror indicated, in answer to a question put by
the judge, that he had received considerable assistance from the
testimony in assessing the credibility of the defendants and of
prosecution witnesses whose testimony contradicted the defendants'
testimony.10 4 In People v. Kenny,'0 the only reported case in
which the results of a lie-detector test were admitted over objection,
Father Summers, inventor of the Summers pathometer, testified
100 Cases of mistaken identity are collected in Borchard, Convicting the Innocent
(1932) and Frank & Frank, Not Guilty (1957). In Houts, From Evidence to Proof
3-10 (1956), the author recounts a classroom demonstration in which the students were
unable accurately to identify the participants. He concludes, at 10-11, "the experiment
illustrates the well-established but often forgotten rule that eyewitness identification is
the most unreliable form of evidence and causes more miscarriages of justice than any
other method of proof." For indications of the unreliability of lay-witness identifica-
tion of handwriting, see Inbau, "Lay Witness Identification of Handwriting," 34 Ill.
L. Rev. 433 (1933).
101 State v. Willard, 346 Mo. 773, 142 S.W.2d 1046 (1940).
102 Shecil v. United States, 226 Fed. 184 (7th Cir. 1915).
103 George, "Scientific Investigation and Defendants' Rights," 57 Mich. L. Rev.
37, 39 (1958). See also, Inbau, op. cit. supra note 69, at 128.
104 The case is recounted in Inbau, supra note 93, at 268 n.5.
105 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S2d 348 (Queens Co. Ct. 1938).
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that he had given a lie-detector test to the defendant and that the
results indicated truth. The defendant was acquitted of robbery.
Thereafter, a questionnaire was submitted to the jurors and ten
replies were received. The results were as follows: (1) prior to the
introduction of the lie-detector evidence, eight jurors would have
voted for an acquittal, and two for conviction; (2) after the intro-
duction of the exculpating lie-detector evidence, the jurors' opinions
were not changed; (3) six jurors stated that the lie-detector evi-
dence was conclusive evidence of innocence; (4) five jurors stated
that they were so impressed by the scientific value of the lie-detector
that they accepted the evidence without question; (5) four jurors
stated that in a subsequent case they would accept as conclusive the
results of a lie-detector test; (6) however, all of the jurors who
favored acquittal stated that the verdict was not based on the lie-
detector evidence alone. °6
Superficially, the results in these two cases seem to lend some
support to the fear of uncritical acceptance. However, the results
cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. Consideration must be given to
the testimony of the examiner. In each case, the examiner was well-
qualified; indeed, he was noted in his field. In the Kenny case there
was apparently unrebutted testimony that the device was 100 per
cent accurate. Consequently, there was a basis for the jury to con-
clude that the conditions of reliability existed. If the only testimony
supports the reliability of the results, why shouldn't the jury accept
the results? It would seem that the jury in each case acted properly
and in accordance with the testimony before it. However, whether
a jury would similarly accept evidence of a lie-detector test in a
case in which opposing counsel could demonstrate the absence of
one or more of the conditions of reliability is conjectural. There is
no reason to assume that it would. To the contrary, if the jury is
properly instructed, there is reason to assume that it would not.
Courts refuse to take judicial notice of reliability.' The re-
fusal is proper because reliability depends upon the facts of each
case. Consequently, the efforts of counsel in proving or disproving
reliability should be crucial. In most cases, it cannot be determined
from the appellate opinions whether there was proof of reliability.
However, with the single exception of the Kenny case, there is no
indication that such proof would result in admissibility.' 8 Indeed,
I0 Forkosch, "The Lie Detector and the Courts," 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 202, 228
(1939).
107 Boeche v. State, supra note 96; People v. Forte, 297 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E2d 31
(1938).
108 See, for example, State v. Bohner, supra note 94, in which a modest effort to
prove reliability was unsuccessful.
[Vol. 25
HYPNO-INDUCED STATEMENTS
as will hereinafter appear, there is reason for suggesting that the
problem of admissibility has been resolved not on the basis of un-
reliability, but rather on the bases of (1) judicial hostility, (2) an
undue attachment to the jury's rudimentary fact-finding methods,
and (3) the stultifying maxim "nothing shall ever be done for the
first time."
5. Reliability of Statements Made Under Narcosis.
a. Some general observations.
It has already been noted that the reliability of lie-detector
results depends upon a number of variables. That the reliability of
statements made under narcosis is a similarly complicated problem
is clear from the following statement of the medical aspect of narco-
analysis:
Formerly utilized as a form of biochemical therapy, [drugs]
are presently employed to induce physiological alterations as a
means for modifying behavior through verbal psycho-therapeutic
efforts. Such drugs as scopolamine and the barbiturates (sodium
pentothol and sodium amytal) have been administered in an
effort to alter the metabolism of the central nervous system and
the psychological adjustment of the patient. Since barbiturates
are relatively non-toxic, and produce fewer unsatisfactory side
effects than scopolamine, they have recently been used with
greater frequency. They act as a central nervous system depres-
sant, primarily on the cerebral cortex-the highest level of the
nervous system-and on the diencephalon or "between-brain,"
and their pathways .... The particular type of behavior mani-
fested under the influence of amytal is a complex resultant of the
interaction of the personality of the subject, his specific physio-
logical and bio-chemical reaction to it, and what is happening to
him at that time.
Hypotheses concerning the mechanism of action of these
drugs generally stress the diminution of fear and anxiety, the
decreased "pressure upon the ego," the opportunity for abreaction,
the process of talking about and "reliving" the foci of emotional
disturbance. 10
Although suggestions have occasionally been made that fewer
variables are present in the case of narcosis and that narco-induced
statements are therefore more reliable than the results of lie-detector
tests," 0 such statements are of doubtful validity because they over-
look the subtleties of the drug problem. Moreover, they obscure
109 Dession, "Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation," 62 Yale L.J.
313, 317 (1953).
110 See McCormick, "Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence," 15 Calif. L. Rev.
484, 493 (1927) ; Comment, "Admissibility of Confessions and Denials Made Under the
Influence of Drugs," 52, Nw. U.L. Rev. 666, 671. n.27 (1957).
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the point that reliability should be determined on a case-by-case
basis rather than on the basis of a general exclusionary or inclusion-
ary rule of evidence.
The story of the discovery of and the initial experience with
drugs in aid of interrogation has already been told "' and will not
be considered herein. However, it is relevant to note that during
the 1920's claims were made for the high reliability of statements
induced by narcosis." 2 These general claims find little support
today insofar as the admissibility of evidence is concerned."13 Al-
though Dr. Huxtable testified in the Nebb case that statements
made under narcosis are generally reliable, his testimony is at odds
with the great weight of authority, both scientific and judicial.
Consideration will first be given to the scientific authority.
b. Scientific autthority and thre problem of reliability.
The substantial weight of scientific opinion is that statements
made under narcosis cannot generally be deemed reliable." 4 The
meaning of this assertion can be seen in the conclusion derived from
certain experiments. In an experiment conducted at Yale Uni-
versity, it was stated that "'normal' individuals (i.e., persons who
perform adequately in their various functions, have good defenses
and no highly pathological characteristics) are less likely to con-
fess." '1- The experimenters concluded:
111 See Despres, "Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements," 14 U. Chi. L. Rev.
601 (1947); Geis, "In Scopolamine Veritas," 50 J. Crim. L.,C.&P.S. 347 (1959);
Moenssens, "Narcoanalysis in Law Enforcement," 52 Id. 453 (1961); Muehlberger,
"Interrogation Under Drug Influence," 42 Id. 513 (1951).
112 See Despres, supra note 111, at 602; Geis, supra note 111, at 351-53.
l3 For a lonely argument in favor of admissibility, see Comment, "Admissibility
of Confessions and Denials Made Under Drugs," supra note 110, at 672-73. At 673
n. 37, the author suggests that courts, by emphasizing the value of a correct decision
of innocence and the cost of an incorrect decision of guilt, might employ a double
standard, admitting exculpatory statements and excluding inculpatory statements made
under narcosis. A similar argument might be made regarding the lie-detector were
it not for the opinion that most erroneous determinations favor the lying subject. See
text to note 83, supra.
114 Statements of the authorities are collected in Dession, supra note 109, at
318-19; Despres, supra note 111, at 605; Geis, supra note 111, at 356; Macdonald,
"Truth Serum," 46 J. Crim. L.,C.&P.S. 259 (1955) ; Moenssens, "Narcoanalysis in Law
Enforcement," 52 J. Crim. L.,C.&P.S. 452 (1961); Muehlberger, supra note 111, at
518-23; Sheedy, "Narcointerrogation of a Criminal Suspect," 50 J. Grim. L.,C&P.S.
118 (1959) ; Note, "Some Problems Relating to the Admissibility of Drug Induced
Confessions," 24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 96, 103-04 (1957). Statements of authorities in
favor of reliability are collected in Comment, "Admissibility of Confessions and Denials
Made Under Drugs," supra note 110, at 670 n. 23.
115 Dession, supra note 109, at 318.
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* . . experimental and clinical findings indicate that only indi-
viduals who have conscious and unconscious reasons for doing
so are inclined to confess and yield to interrogation under drug
influence. On the other hand, some are able to withhold informa-
tion and some, especially character neurotics, are able to lie.116
Similar conclusions were reached by experimenters at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin:
: * . in general... the subjects who were resistant to suggestions
in the normal state were also resistant when under the influence
of the drug. There was a fairly marked tendency, however, for
those who were susceptible in the normal state to be markedly
more so when under the influence of scopolamine.117
Moreover, the authorities are in substantial agreement that persons
under narcosis are highly suggestible and that neurotics under nar-
cosis tend to substitute fantasy for truth."8' The aspect of suggesti-
bility indicates the pitfall of the leading question. Although the
matter is usually considered with reference to the inculpatory state-
ment," 9 it should also be considered with reference to the exculpa-
tory statement as a factor complicating the reliability problem.
By way of summary, the following observation is pertinent:
Finally it is most important to realize that the conduct of the
interrogation and the analysis of its verbal and behavioral content
are exceedingly complex. The results can be evaluated properly
only by trained and experienced experts who are aware of the
manifold individual variations in response which occur.1 20
As this quotation suggests, the determination of reliability of a
narco-induced statement may rest upon the opinion of an expert
that the statement is or is not reliable. This suggestion is, of course,
similar to the suggestion already made regarding lie-detector results
that reliability be determined on a case-by-case basis in accordance
with testimony as to the criteria of reliability.
c. The judicial approach to the problem of reliability.
It has already been noted that courts, without exception, have
held inadmissible exculpatory statements made under narcosis and
116 Id. at 319.
117 Hull, Hypnosis and Suggestibility: An Experimental Approach 99 (1933),
quoted in Geis, supra note 111, at 356. In an experiment conducted in the early 1930's
at the Northwestern University Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory involving con-
trolled questions and subjects of high intelligence quotient, factual information was
obtained in 75-85 per cent of the cases. The experiment is described in Muehlberger,
supra note 111, at 515-18. In the author's opinion, departure from controlled condi-
tions considerably lessens reliability. Id. at 518.
118 Supra notes 114-17.
"19 See Muehlberger, supra note 111, at 516-17.
120 Dession, supra note 109, at 319-20.
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that a common ground for decision is unreliability. In some of the
cases, the result is unquestionably correct because counsel appar-
ently made no effort to prove reliability.121 But even in these cases,
the result does not turn upon the absence of proof. Rather, the
courts invoke a general rule of unreliability and indicate no aware-
ness of the argument that a determination of reliability should be
based upon the testimony of an expert regarding the presence or ab-
sence of the conditions of reliability in the particular case. 22 Indeed,
in an early case, the court blatantly characterized narco-induced
statements as "clap-trap." 123 That a general rule of unreliability
is applied is even more apparent from the few cases in which an
abortive effort has been made to prove reliability. In State v.
Lindemutt, 124 the defendant, charged with murder, offered to
prove that he had made pre-trial, narco-induced, exculpatory state-
ments to a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist testified that sodium
pentothol would produce reliable statements and that this was
generally recognized by practitioners of psychiatry. Another psy-
chiatrist testified in rebuttal as to unreliability and stated that
narco-induced statements were not generally regarded as reliable
by psychiatrists. Insofar as the facts are disclosed in the appellate
opinion, there was ample basis for the court to exclude the proffered
evidence. The court could have held that the general assertion of
reliability was contrary to the weight of scientific opinion. Or the
court could have held that the general assertion of reliability was
insufficient in that it did not focus upon the factors of reliability in
the particular case. Instead, the court demanded the impossible:
clear proof of general scientific opinion of reliability. In Dugan v.
Commonwealth,125 the court was slightly more incisive. The defense
psychiatrist testified that he had previously achieved reliable results
with narcosis. However, apparently he did not testify as to the
conditions under which he narcotized the defendant and as to the
existence of reliability factors in the defendant's case. His failure
so to testify was one basis for the court's affirming the exclusion
121 State v. Hudson, 289 S.W. 920 (Mo. 1926); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla.
Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951); Orange v. Commonwealth,
191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950).
122 Even in the rare case in which there is some indication that the court is aware
of the expert's role, the evidence is held inadmissible. In People v. Cuen, 37 Cal. 2d
614, 626-27, 234 P.2d 1, 8 (1951), it was stated:
And the offer of proof indicated that the statements to be produced would be
hearsay, self-serving, and conjectural since the truth thereof would depend en-
tirely on the psychiatrist's opinion which conceivably might conflict with the
opinion of another psychiatrist.
123 State v. Hudson, supra note 121, at 921.
124 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952).
125 333 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1960).
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of the proffered evidence. But two other bases were also relied
upon. The court found that there was no evidence of general scien-
tific acceptance and that there was no evidence of the "certainty of
truth" 126 of the defendant's statements. Again the court required
the impossible.
If, in these two cases, the appellate opinions contain the
entirety of the evidence proffered, defense counsel was partly at
fault in failing to elicit testimony as to the reliability of the defend-
ant's statements. But even with such testimony in the record there
is every reason to suspect that the results would have remained the
same and that the courts still would have relied upon an unreal-
istically high standard of reliability with reference both to the
narco-induced statement in question ("certainty of truth") and to
narco-induced statements in general (general scientific acceptance).
Thus, as in the case of the lie-detector, so also in the case of
truth serum there is what is tantamount to a conclusive presump-
tion against reliability.
6. Reliability of Statements Made Under Hypnosis.
a. Some general observations.
Thus far an effort has been made in this article (1) to explore
the problem of reliability in the context of lie-detector and truth
serum; (2) to isolate the factors or conditions of reliability; (3)
to note general scientific attitudes or opinions regarding the reliabil-
ity problem; (4) to note the blind and rigid judicial approach to
the reliability problem; and (5) to suggest a treatment of the
reliability problem in which emphasis is placed upon the presence
or absence of reliability factors in a particular case rather than
upon a requirement of general scientific acceptance. This effort has
been made to furnish a basis for comparison in analyzing the
reliability problem in the context of hypnosis and in predicting the
probable judicial treatment of this problem. In this inquiry,
consideration will first be given to the nature of hypnosis.
An early commentator has described the hypnosis as follows:
In its simpler manifestation it is a modified form of natural
sleep, artificially induced, but in its more complex form it com-
pares to the abnormal condition of natural sleep known as
somnambulism.' 27
However, hypnosis is not the same as sleep. The subject is aware;
at the same time, he is in a state of increased suggestibility and
126 333 S.W2d at 757.
127 Sudduth, "Hypnotism and Crime," 13 Medico-Legal J. 239, 244 (1995).
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he readily, and often uncritically, cooperates with the hypnotist.12
Not all persons can be hypnotized. Although statements have been
made that a large proportion of the population can be hypnotized, 129
the statements do not apply to young children, to adults incapable
of prolonged attention,130 or to persons with certain mental dis-
orders.' 31 Thus, at the threshhold of inquiry there is encountered
the reliability factor of the subject. Another factor is to be found
in the depth of the hypnotic state. There are various states or
stages of hypnosis. 3 2 Although the authorities do not agree on the
number of stages,133 there is agreement that suggestibility increases
as depth increases.' 3 4 Finally there is the factor of the hypnotist.
It is not necessary that he be a psychiatrist, doctor of medicine, or
psychologist. Many cases exist in which the hypnotist had a
meager educational background and a relatively low intelligence
quotientY.'3  The background of the hypnotist would, however, be
an important factor in evaluating his opinion of the reliability of
statements induced by him. Moreover, it might also be an important
factor in another aspect of the reliability problem, the relationship
between hypnotist and subject. This relationship, influential upon
the efficacy of hypnosis, comprehends the hypnotist's confidence in
his own ability, the hypnotist's confidence in hypnosis as a device
to achieve the desired result, the subject's attitude toward hypnosis,
the subject's attitude as shaped by the circumstances of crim-
inal interrogation, and the subject's understanding of what is
expected of him.'36
b. The scientific consensus regarding the problem of reliability.
In the Nebb case, Dr. Huxtable testified generally that state-
ments made under hypnosis are reliable.' He qualified his testi-
128 14 Encyclopedia Americana 604 (1950); 12 Encyclopedia Britannica 23
(1958) ; Allen, "Hypnotism and Its Legal Import," 12 Can. B. Rev. 14, 15 (1934);
Note, "Hypnotism, Suggestibility & the Law," 31 Neb. L. Rev. 575, 576 (1952).
129 Allen, supra note 128, at 16; Ladd, "Legal Aspects of Hypnotism," 11 Yale
L.J. 173, 175 (1902).
130 Ladd, .supra note 129.
131 See text to notes 21 and 27, supra.
132 Note, "Hypnotism, Suggestibility and the Law," supra note 128, at 586-87.
'33 Id. at 587 n. 55.
134 Id. at 586-87.
135 The most notable recent example is the Danish case recounted in Reiter,
Antisocial or Criminal Acts and Hypnosis (1958), in which the author takes the posi-
tion that the subject was induced by hypnosis to commit robbery and murder. The
hypnotist was an ex-convict and was of low intelligence.
136 See Schneck, "Hypnosis in Psychiatry," in Hypnosis in Modem Medicine
143-44 (1959). Although Schneck's discussion relates to the efficacy of hypnosis as a
psychotherapeutic tool, the factors enumerated would appear relevant to the problem
of induced statements.
137 See text to notes 20-27, supra.
[Vol. 25
HYPNO-INDUCED STATEMENTS
mony somewhat by noting the reliability factors of subject and
depth of hypnosis.138 But, taken as a whole, his testimony was
strongly in favor of reliability as a general proposition. In addition,
he testified that Arthur Nebb was a good subject and he stated his
opinion of the reliability of Nebb's pre-trial, hypno-induced state-
ments.139 Thus there was in the record testimony relating to
reliability in general and testimony relating to the reliability of
Nebb's statements in particular. The latter testimony cannot be
assailed absent further investigation of Nebb and of the circum-
stances under which his statements were made. The former
testimony, however, is not in harmony with the prevailing view.
According to most medico-legal authorities, it cannot be said gen-
erally that hypno-induced statements are reliable. 140 In a treatise
on medical hypnosis it is stated, "A guilty person, it would appear,
is just as much likely to resist the truth under hypnosis as when
he is in his normal state." 141 And, in an early leading article on
hypnosis, it was observed:
Now it is theoretically quite possible that the truth might some-
times, perhaps frequently, be obtained in this way. For the ancient
motto, in %ino veritas, applies very well to the hypnotic condition
on making the necessary changes in the language. According to
the more general features of the condition itself, the memory of
what had occurred . . . would be more likely to revive and cor-
rectly to reproduce these occurrences .... Moreover, as we have
already seen, the loss of self-control is distinctive of this condition;
and secrets, even when to divulge them would convict of punishable
crime the person concerned, are very likely to be let slip when that
person is in the hands of the skillful practitioner of hypnotism.
On the other hand, if there is a chance of getting truth, which he
might otherwise be able and might very much wish to conceal,
from the hypnotized as well as from the drunken man, there is
also a very good chance of getting a large admixture of mistake
and falsehood. For hypnotic subjects, like alcoholic subjects, can
lie consciously; they even invent subtle webs of falsehood, as well
as those who are in the normal state of waking. Indeed, in cer-
tain cases the disposition to prevaricate, and a certain low but
effective form of animal cunning, are developed by the hypnosis
itself; while an increased suggestibility for all kinds of illusions
138 See text to notes 25-27, supra.
139 See text to note 29, mspra.
140 Ambrose & Newbold, Handbook of Medical Hypnosis 23 (1958); Forel,
Hypnotism and Psychotherapy 292-93 (1907) ; III Wigmore, Evidence §998, at 643
(3d ed. 1940); Allen, supra note 128, at 89-90; Bannister, "Hypnotic Influence in
Criminal Cases," 51 Albany L. Rev. 87, 88 (1895); Ladd, supra note 129, at 179,
187-88. For collections of other authorities, see Note, "Hypnotism, Suggestibility and
the Law," supra note 128, at 591; 42 Harv. L. Rev. 704 (1929).
141 Ambrose & Newbold, op. cit. supra note 140.
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and hallucinations is as much an essential feature of the dream-life
of hypnotic, as it is of normal sleep. 142
These opinions are buttressed by the conclusions of the noted
psychiatrist Erickson who conducted many experiments with hyp-
notized subjects. He found that although hypnosis may in some
instances be very effective in getting information from the subject,
often the desire for self protection remains unaffected by hypnosis,
and the subject may lie. 143
All of these views, representative of the medico-legal consensus,
have particular relevance to the topic at hand, the admissibility of
exculpatory statements. The defendant may be lying; his state-
ments may have been suggested by unrecorded leading questions;
there is no general acceptance of the reliability of hypno-induced
statements.
Thus, although the few reported decisions of inadmissibility in
cases of hypnosis are lacking in analysis, they can be supported by
the reasoning of the lie-detector and truth serum cases. This rea-
soning, as already stated, is subject to question. If, in a case such
as Nebb, there is unrebutted testimony by an expert that the con-
ditions of reliability have been met and that the defendant's
hypno-induced statements are reliable, why should such statements
be excluded? Does the rudimentary (but traditional) method by
which a jury attempts to assess credibility offer a greater likelihood
of "truth" than the scientific method? Does the lay fact-finder
possess an omniscience denied to the scientist? It is incredible that
in a system purporting to be devoted to a search for the truth,
expertise is ignored, indeed is rebuffed, by the imposition of stand-
ards which cannot now be (and, perhaps, can never be) met. A
long second-look should be given to the requirement of general
scientific acceptance of reliability.'44
142 Ladd, supra note 129, at 187-88.
143 Erickson, "An Experimental Investigation of the Possible Anti-Social Uses
of Hypnosis," 2 Psychiatry 391, 398-99, 404 (1939).
In the Nebb case, the defendant apparently lied under hypnosis. Regarding
his statement to the Olivers, he testified initially that he said, "I got them both."
Thereafter, he admitted that he said, "I ought to kill them both." p. 7, supra.
'44 In the discussion of the reliability problem as it relates to narco-induced and
hypno-induced statements, reference has not been made to the argument that such
statements would have too great an impact upon the jury, that is, that the jury would
accept them uncritically. This argument was considered in connection with the dis-
cussion of lie-detectors. However, a difference should be noted between the lie-detector
situation, on the one hand, and the narcosis and hypnosis situations, on the other hand.
In the former, there is little likelihood of a demonstration being conducted in the
courtroom. Privacy is one of the requisites of an interrogation by lie-detector. Inbau,
Lie Detection & Criminal Interrogation 9 (3d ed. 1953). In the latter, there is a
greater likelihood at least of a proffered intra-judicial demonstration. Arguably, such
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Suppose, however, that this general requirement were relaxed
and that, insofar as reliability is concerned, it would be sufficient,
as suggested in this article, for the defendant to prove by expert
testimony the reliability of his statements in particular. Further,
put to one side, for the moment, the possibility of any other basis
for objection (e.g., the hearsay rule) .' A rule of admissibility is
thereby created. How should the rule operate?
c. The mechanics of a suggested rule of admissibility.
At the outset, a distinction should be noted between (1) the
testimony of the expert relating to reliability, and (2) the testimony,
presumably of the expert, that the defendant made extra-judicial,
exculpatory statements. The initial question concerns the relevance
of each type of testimony. Clearly, the testimony relating to re-
liability is relevant as a foundation for admissibility of the excul-
patory statements. Just as clearly, it is relevant to the credibility
of, or the weight to be accorded to, the exculpatory statements.
However, it is not directly relevant on the merits. That is, it should
not be considered as evidence that the incident occurred as the
defendant claims it did. On the other hand, a different rule should
apply to the testimony that extra-judicial, exculpatory statements
were made by the defendant. This testimony is relevant to the
credibility of any intra-judicial, exculpatory statement made by the
defendant. It is also relevant on the merits. That is, it should be
considered as evidence of the facts asserted in the exculpatory state-
ment (remember that the hearsay rule has been put aside for
purposes of this immediate discussion).
The question of relevancy having been answered, consideration
will now be given to the operation of the suggested rule of admis-
sibility. Suppose that D, charged with murder, claims that he
was the victim of an unprovoked, violent attack by the deceased,
and that he killed in self defense. Two disinterested eyewitnesses,
however, state that D was the aggressor. Prior to trial, D's attorney
decides that D should be interrogated under hypnosis, he obtains
the cooperation of a reputable medical hypnotist, and arrangements
are made for the interrogation. At this point, and as a condition of
admissibility, should the prosecutor be given notice and an oppor-
a demonstration might aggravate the problem of impact. Empirical evidence is lack-
ing. However, several persons who attended the Nebb trial told me that the hypno-
induced testimony had great impact upon them. Does this suggest that a higher
standard of reliability be required in the case of an intra-judicial interrogation than
might be required in the case of testimony regarding an extra-judicial interrogation?
I would answer the question in the negative absent evidence of uncritical acceptance.
145 Other bases for objection are considered infra at pp. 39-40.
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tunity to participate in the interrogation? 14' The consequences of
a negative answer will depend upon the content of the hypno-
induced statement. If the statement turns out to be inculpatory,
the prosecutor's want of knowledge preserves whatever values may
be thought to exist in the "sporting theory" of criminal law, the
defendant is not put in the position of aiding the prosecution's case,
and he is given an opportunity (which assuredly he will use) to
suppress evidence adverse to him. If the statement happens to be
exculpatory, the prosecutor's absence deprives the state of the
chance to rebut the expert's testimony regarding the criteria of
reliability and to rebut his opinion in favor of reliability. Although
rebuttal could be attempted by means of a hypothetical question
addressed to the state's expert and embracing the facts testified
to by the defense's expert, such an approach is not wholly satisfac-
tory because it pits the testimony of the expert who was present
and who testifies on the basis of observation against the testimony
of the expert who was absent and who testifies on the basis of
hypothesis.
Is there any affirmative reason why the state should be
prohibited from participating in the initial interrogation? An
answer might be attempted in terms of the privilege against self-
incrimination (not unrelated to the "sporting theory" of criminal
law) .M4 However, in such an answer consideration cannot be given
to the inculpatory-exculpatory dichotomy referred to above for the
reason that the problem arises in point of time immediately before
the initial interrogation under hypnosis at which point it is not
known whether the statement will be inculpatory or exculpatory
or, indeed, whether the conditions of reliability, hence admissibility,
exist. Thus the privilege issue can be stated as follows: is the privi-
lege against self-incrimination violated if, as a condition upon the
possible admissibility of an exculpatory statement, the defendant
must take the risk of a possibly admissible, incriminatory state-
ment? If the question is complicated, the answer is even more
complicated because it depends upon a choice of law. If the case
arises in a state court, both state and federal (fourteenth amend-
ment) questions are present; if the case arises in a federal court, a
fifth amendment question is presented.
The fourteenth amendment question is resolvable against the
defendant on the basis of the decisions in Twining v. New Jersey 148
146 If defendant is incarcerated, the prosecution vill in most cases receive notice
from the director of the confinement facility. The problem then is limited to oppor-
tunity to participate.
147 See McNaughton, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," 51 J. Crim.
L.,C.&P.S. 139 (1960).
148 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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and Adamson v. California.149 In these cases the Court held that
(1) the fifth amendment is not made operative upon the states
by the fourteenth amendment, (2) the privilege against self-
incrimination is not within the "privileges or immunities" clause of
the fourteenth amendment; and (3) the impairment of the privilege
is not fundamentally unfair within the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Whether these cases will retain their vitality
is conjectural, 50 and neither Mapp v. Ohio 151 nor the recent change
in the membership of the Court is an irrelevant consideration. But
for the present these cases do exist and they afford a ready solution
to the fourteenth amendment question.
A more difficult question is presented by the fifth amendment
and by parallel state constitutional provisions. Clearly the pro-
ceeding is criminal, the defendant is a person to whom the privilege
attaches, and the utterance is testimonial. This much can be said
under either state or federal provisions. But does the utterance tend
to incriminate? The question is a monstrous one because it must
be asked before anyone knows the content of the utterance. Not
even the subject knows what he will say under the influence of
hypnosis! This dilemma, it might be argued, is good because it
will deter a guilty subject from attempting to lie. But, on the other
hand, it may well deter an innocent subject from taking the risk of
making false, incriminatory statements. 5 ' Quite probably the risk
can be diminished if the hypnotist is a psychiatrist and properly
evaluates the subject. But the evaluation, by hypothesis, excludes
consideration of the utterances and is, therefore, of diminished
utility. Consequently the situation remains one of doubt.
In view of these considerations, there would seem to be suffi-
cient risk of incrimination to warrant the conclusion that the
149 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
150 See Sowle, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Principles and
Trends," 51 J. Crim. L.,C.&P.S. 131, 132 (1960). There is reason to believe that the
issue is ripe for reconsideration. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a
state self-incrimination case. Malloy v. Hogan,--Conn.-,1I7 A.2d 744 (193), cert.
grantcd, 31 U.S.L. Week 3395 (U.S. June 3, 1963) (No. 1031).
For another aspect of the fourteenth amendment problem, the conditioning of
state employment upon exercise or waiver of the privilege, compare Nelson v. County
of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960), and Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958), and
Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958), and Adler v. Board of Education,
342 U.S. 485 (1952), and Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), with
Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956), and Wiemann v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952).
15 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (state prohibited by fourteenth amendment from using
illegally obtained evidence).
152 It does not suffice to argue that such statements are by definition unreliable
and therefore inadmissible. What the subject wants to avoid is the risk of an erroneous
decision that the evidence is admissible.
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utterance may tend to incriminate within the meaning of the
privilege. As stated in Hoffman v. United States:
However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required
to prove the hazard [of incrimination] in the sense in which a
claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be
compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is
designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be
evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in
which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an
explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result.'5 3 (Emphasis added.)
It is true that Hoffman involved a refusal to answer questions at a
grand jury hearing and that the case is therefore factually distin-
guishable from the hypothetical case under consideration. How-
ever, the rationale of Hoffman, epitomized by such words as "might"
and "could," is applicable. Moreover, in the hypothetical case there
is absent the question of whether the tendency to incriminate is
asserted in good faith. If the subject cannot know the effect upon
his answers of hypnosis (or narcosis) it can hardly be said that bad
faith exists in his reluctance to make a public disclosure.
The only question remaining, then, is whether there is compul-
sion. Compulsion by means of physical force is absent from this
case. Also absent is compulsion by means of judicial decree enforce-
able through contempt proceedings. What is present is a form of
indirect compusion inherent in the dilemma referred to above.
Does such indirect compulsion violate the federal and state pro-
visions against self-incrimination? From an historical standpoint,
the answer is no. The privilege was designed to guard against
inquisitorial practices attended by direct compulsion. 54 Indeed, the
privilege was the creature of a system in which the accused was not
competent to testify, and so it has been argued that indirect com-
pulsion, the effect of which is to force the accused to testify, is not a
violation of the privilege.'55 But the historical argument is not an
end-all. As Mr. Justice Brandeis observed in his dissenting opinion
in the wire-tapping case of Olmstead v. United States:
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, "the
form that evil had theretofore taken," had been necessarily simple.
Force and violence were then the only means known to man by
which a Government could directly effect self-incrimination ....
153 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951). See also Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118,
121 (1957).
154 Note, "Comment on Defendant's Failure to Take the Stand," 57 Yale L.J.
145, 150 (1947) ; 22 Cornell L.Q. 392, 394 (1937) ; 50 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 357 (1936).
155 Bruce, "The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify,"
31 Mich. L. Rev. 226 (1932). See also articles cited in note 154, supra.
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But "time works changes, brings into existence new conditions
and purposes." . . .
Moreover, "in the application of a constitution, our contem-
plation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be." 156
Although this observation may serve to neutralize the historical
argument, it does not answer the question. Certainly it does not
compel the conclusion that the privilege is violated in the case
under consideration. Nor is that conclusion compelled by recent
federal cases. In Orloff v. Willougkby, ' 7 the petitioner, a psy-
chiatrist, refused to divulge information requested in connection
with his application for a military commission. He was then drafted,
was assigned to "low-level" medical duties, and sought release by a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As his case progressed through
the federal judicial hierarchy, he claimed variously that (1) he was
entitled to discharge, (2) he was entitled to a commission, and (3)
he was entitled to perform the gamut of psychiatric functions. These
claims were rejected by a divided Court. Mr. Justice Jackson,
writing for the majority, stated:
It is argued that Orloff is being punished for having claimed
a privilege which the Constitution guarantees. No one, at least no
one on this Court which has repeatedly sustained assertion by
Communists of the privilege against self-incrimination, questions
or doubts Orloff's right to withhold facts about himself on that
ground. No one believes he can be punished for doing so. But
the question is whether he can at the same time take the position
that to tell the truth about himself might incriminate him and that
even so the President must appoint him to a post of honor and
trust. We have no hesitation in answering that question "No." 158
Implicit in this quotation is the premise that the indirect compul-
sion present in Orloff was not a punishment for exercise of the
privilege and was not, therefore, prohibited by the privilege.
In Kim v. Rosenberg,59 a deportation statute was interpreted
as placing upon the petitioner the burden of disproving Communist
affiliation. The petitioner claimed privilege and refused to give
information on this point. The Court affirmed the order of deporta-
tion in an opinion in which the question of indirect compulsion was
not even alluded to.
In Kaufman v. Hurwitz,160 the appellant was denied a dis-
charge in bankruptcy pursuant to a statute which conditioned
discharge upon a satisfactory explanation for lost assets. Appellant
156 277 U.S. 438, 473-74 (1928).
157 354 U.S. 83 (1953).
1S8 Id. at 91.
159 363 U.S. 405 (1960).
160 176 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1949).
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had claimed privilege and refused to explain. In affirming the trial
court's decision, the court of appeals specifically referred to the
dilemma of indirect compulsion through denial of discharge. How-
ever, it held that the legislature could impose upon the privilege of
discharge the condition of disclosure.
These cases, by no means exhaustive of federal decisions,"' 1
are, of course, factually distinguishable from the problem case.
Yet each of these cases supports the theory that the exercise of a
privilege or benefit (military commission, residence in the United
States, discharge in bankruptcy) can be conditioned so as to place
upon the defendant the risk of incrimination, and that the condition
is not constitutionally invalid. Thus, these federal cases and related
state cases 162 indicate the difficulty of asserting, under current law,
that there is, in the problem case, an impermissible compulsion.
Compulsion there is; but it takes the form of a condition (the prose-
cutor's participation in the initial interrogation) upon that which
is hardly a natural right and which fairly can be labelled a privilege
or benefit (the admissibility of a particular type of evidence).16
Therefore, in the problem case the conclusion is that the privilege
against self-incrimination is not violated."0 4
161 An approach in favor of the privilege against self-incrimination is suggested
in Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958). There, the court
declared unconstitutional (unreasonable classification; bill of attainder) a statute
which wrested retirement benefits from federal employees who claimed the privilege
against self-incrimination. For comments in favor of the Steinberg result, see 47 Geo.
L.J. 597 (1959) ; 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 880 (1959) ; 44 Va. L. Rev. 1330 (1958). For a
dissenting view, see 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 382 (1959).
162 State cases are collected in VIII Wigmore, Evidence §2272, at 441-44
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
163 To be distinguished from the problem case are the two cases in which state
courts have declared unconstitutional statutes authorizing the prosecutor to comment
upon the failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf. In re Opinion of the
justices, 300 Mass. 620, 15 N.E. 2d 662 (1938) ; State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 266 N.W.
116 (1936). The inarticulate premise of these cases is that the threat of the prose-
cutor's comment operates to compel the defendant to testify. The premise is probably
correct. See Note, "Comment on Defendant's Failure to Take the Stand," supra note
154, at 149 n. 21. However, these cases do not involve indirect compulsion in the form
of a condition attached to a "benefit." Nor do the opinions purport to proscribe all
forms of indirect compulsion.
More to the point are two cases in which the prosecutor's comment was held not
to violate the privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200 (1867) ;
State v. Baker, 115 Vt. 94, 53 A.2d 53 (1947). If the prosecutor's comment is not in
violation of the privilege, one may argue, a fortiori, that the rule applies to indirect
compulsion in the form of a conditional benefit.
Also to the point are statutes prohibiting comment by the prosecutor. These
statutes have been used as the basis for an argument that the constitutional provisions
against self-incrimination were given a contemporaneous legislative interpretation as
not barring comment by the prosecutor. Bruce, supra note 155, at 233-34.
164 Compare with the above problem and suggested solution the problem of the
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However, this conclusion only removes a constitutional objec-
tion. It does not serve to answer the question whether, from the
standpoint of wise policy, the prosecutor should be given an
opportunity to participate in the initial interrogation. Some aspects
of this question have already been considered, 6" and it must be
evident that a dogmatic answer is impossible. Only two dogmas
are available: the dogma of truth and the dogma of the values of
the adversary system. The former is desirable; the latter is estab-
lished, particularly in criminal law. A rule permitting the prosecutor
to participate in the initial interrogation would represent a sub-
stantial erosion of the adversary system, perhaps to such an extent
that it would be unacceptable to many lawyers, judges, and law-
trained legislators. Moreover, the rule might operate to deter an
accused from using one of the techniques under consideration. On
the other hand, if the prosecutor had no access at all to the accused,
the rule would be unfair to the state. Between these extremes lies a
middle ground. Permit the accused a private, initial interrogation.
If the result is inculpatory, let his attorney handle the matter as he
would handle any other type of inculpatory information uncovered
during the course of investigation. 6 If the result is exculpatory,
require, as a condition of admissibility, that the prosecutor be given
access to the defendant's expert and that the prosecutor be given
an opportunity to interrogate the defendant with the assistance of
the prosecution's own expert. Within the suggested procedure is
to be found the prevailing adjustment between full disclosure and
adversary values. Consequently, the suggestion should not arouse
great criticism from those who are steeped in the tradition of
advocacy. 16 7 To a certain extent however, the search for truth is
defendant who may be deterred from testifying in his own behalf by the threat of a
vigorous cross-examination. This threat comprehends impeachment by (1) contra-
dictory statements made during cross-examination, (2) prior inconsistent statements,
and (3) prior convictions. However, the defendant is not permitted to play both ends
against the middle. If he wants to avoid the threat, he must refrain from testifying.
If he wants the benefits of a direct-examination, he must take the risk of a detri-
mental cross-examination.
165 See text between notes 146 and 147, supra; see text to note 152, supra.
166 The inculpatory statements should, therefore, be protected from disclosure by
the expert to the prosecutor. Protection might be based on the attorney-client privilege.
See McCormick, Evidence §100 (1954).
167 There is nothing novel in the requirement of notice to the prosecution. In
Ohio, for example, the defendant is required by statute to give notice to the prose-
cution if the defense of alibi is to be raised. Notice must be given not less than three
days before trial and must ".... include specific information as to the place at which
the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense' Ohio Rev. Code
§2945.58. If the defendant fails to give notice the court may exclude evidence in sup-
port of the defense. Id. For a more complete discussion of the alibi problem and the
parallel problem of the special plea of insanity, see Paulsen & Kadish, Criminal Law
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frustrated. Yet the frustration need not be of substantial practical
importance. The teaching of past experience is that hypnosis and
related techniques are used primarily in cases in which the evidence
strongly favors the state and in which the defense is predicated
almost entirely upon the testimony of the defendant. In such
cases there does not appear to be a significant risk that the trier
of fact will, because of the withholding of an incriminatory state-
ment, erroneously determine that the defendant is innocent. For
all of these reasons, therefore, the suggestion is made herein that
the prosecutor be permitted a "second stage" interrogation.16
Returning to the problem case, suppose that the initial inter-
rogation is conducted by D's attorney under the supervision of a
qualified medical hypnotist; that under hypnosis D maintains that
he was the victim of an unprovoked and violent attack; that the
expert is satisfied that the conditions of reliability are present; and
that he is willing to state his opinion in court. Suppose, further,
that notice is given to the prosecutor; that he interrogates the
expert; and that he interrogates D under the supervision of a quali-
fied medical hypnotist for the state. Of what judicial significance
is the second interrogation? The answer to this question should
depend upon the results of the second interrogation measured by
the opinion of the state's expert.
D inc'ulpates self; expert opinion: uznreliable. In this situation,
the inculpatory statements should not be admitted as evidence of
guilt. Whether the fact of inculpation and the opinion of unreliabil-
ity should be admitted will depend upon whether they are
relevant in the cross-examination of D's expert. The effect of cross-
examination will be considered later.
and its Processes 1016 (1962). In Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P2d
919 (1962), the California Supreme Court held that the state constitutional provision
against self-incrimination was not violated by an order directing the defendant in a
rape case to disclose to the prosecution the evidence in support of a claim of impotency.
The case is discussed in Comment, "The Self-Incrimination Privilege: Barrier to
Criminal Discovery?," 51 Calif. L. Rev. 135 (1963) ; 61 Mich. L. Rev. 987 (1963) ; 15
Stan. L. Rev. 700 (1963).
168 This suggestion is a rejection of another approach: the appointment of a
panel of expert witnesses. The suggestion also serves to eliminate as a basis for in-
admissibility the argument that the defendant derives an unfair advantage from an
extra-judicial statement because he is not subjected to cross-examination. See State v.
Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952) (truth serum); State v. Bohner, 210
Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933). Should it be argued that the prosecutor is still at
a disadvantage because he has no assurance that the defendant will testify at the
trial, the answer is this: (1) treat the offered extra-judicial, exculpatory statement
as a waiver of the defendant's right not to testify; or (2) permit the prosecutor to
impeach the credibility of the extra-judicial statement by any means permissible for
the impeachment of an intra-judicial statement.
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D inculpates self; expert opinion: reliable. In this situation,
if the proper foundation is established, both the inculpatory state-
ment and the exculpatory statement should be admitted on the
merits. In addition, each statement and the attending opinion
should be considered in the cross-examination of each expert.
D exculpates self; expert opinion: unreliable. In this situation,
the second exculpatory statement should not be admitted on the
merits as corroborating the first exculpatory statement. However,
the opinion of unreliability should be considered in the cross-
examination of D's expert.
D exculpates self; expert opinion: reliable. In this situation, the
second exculpatory statement should be admitted on the merits,
assuming the proper foundation testimony. In addition, each state-
ment and expert's opinion should be admitted as corroborating the
other statement and opinion.
From the statement of these problems and proposed solutions,
it is apparent that several questions remain. First, what minimum
qualifications should the expert have? In a case involving hypnosis,
the expert should be a doctor of medicine, and, because the validity
of his opinion will depend in substantial part upon his evaluation of
the subject, he should either be a practicing psychiatrist or have
such a practice as requires frequent psychiatric judgments. In
addition, he should frequently use the techniques of hypnosis in
his practice. These requirements should also prevail in cases of
narcosis. Regarding the lie-detector, the expert, in addition to
possessing expertise in the use of the polygraph, should, at a mini-
mum, be a practicing clinical psychologist. The judgments which
the expert is called upon to make are sufficiently complicated to
warrant this requirement in spite of the fact that the requirement
will make inadmissible the results of a lie-detector examination
administered typically by a police officer.
Secondly, what should be the minimum content of the expert's
testimony for purposes of establishing a foundation? At the outset
the expert should state the conditions of reliability and the factors
which impair reliability. Then, he should relate these general state-
ments to the facts of the case at hand. Finally, he should give an
affirmative answer to a question phrased somewhat as follows:
"Consider the following: (1) your knowledge of and experience
with hypnosis; (2) your participation in an interrogation of the
defendant while he was under hypnosis induced by you; (3)
your knowledge of the conditions of reliability of hypno-induced
statements; (4) the presence or absence of any of these conditions
during the interrogation of the defendant; and (5) the statements
made by the defendant while under hypnosis. Having considered
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these factors, would you accept the defendant's hypno-induced
statements, along with other evidence, as a basis for making an
informed and intelligent judgment?"
Thirdly, how should a determination regarding admissibility
be made in a case in which there is conflicting evidence of reliability?
Initially, the defendant's expert should be examined and cross-
examined in the absence of the jury. Assume that he gives an
affirmative answer to the question above and that he adheres to
the answer on cross-examination. Assume, further, that the prose-
cution's expert gives contradictory testimony, also in the absence
of the jury. The only question, then, is whether the defendant has
prima facie established reliability. The answer is that he has, and
that the judge must rule in favor of admissibility. Cross-examination
of the defendant's expert, not resulting in abandonment of his
opinion, and contradictory testimony of the prosecution's expert
should relate to weight rather than admissibility. Once admissibility
is determined, the testimony should be given again, this time in the
presence of the jury. In addition, the jury should receive the state-
ments made by the defendant.
This procedure is, of course, open to the complaint that it
fosters a battle of the experts. But what of it? The battle should
be fought on the field of expertise rather than on the field of guess-
work. The question whether the jury will be able to comprehend the
testimony of the experts cannot be answered with assurance. But if
there is difficulty in comprehension, the fault lies not in the subject
matter and not with the experts. It lies, rather, with lawyers who
prefer to demonstrate a smattering of ignorance by using technical
terms in examination instead of conducting a well-prepared exam-
ination which takes into account the difficulties of communication.
These difficulties are not insuperable and should not be a basis for
the rejection of evidence. The hoary cries, "battle of the experts"
and "incomprehensible," found in the lie-detector and truth serum
cases 169 should be recognized as makeweights rather than reasons.
It is true that the jury may be confronted with conflicting expert
testimony and that the matter may be difficult for the jury to
resolve, but that problem is an inherent part of the decision-making
process. It is hardly a reason for the exclusion of evidence. It, too,
is a makeweight.
Also a makeweight is the argument that expert testimony will
usurp the jury's fact-finding function.170 This argument, embracing
a tacit assumption that the jury will understand the experts' testi-
169 See, for example, People v. Cullen, 37 Cal. 2d 614, 234 P.2d (1951) (truth
serum) ; State v. Lindemuth, supra note 168; State v. Bohner, supra note 168. See
also, Inbau, op. cit. supra note 144, at 129-30.
170 See Dugan v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Ky. 1960) (truth
(Vol. 25
HYPNO-INDUCED STATEMENTS
mony, is singularly at odds with the argument, discussed above,
that the jury will not understand the testimony. Moreover, the
argument is deceiving. "Usurp" is a nasty word; it connotes a force-
ful and illegitimate ouster. It conjures up visions of an expert
witness grabbing a juror by the scruff of the neck and demanding
that the juror decide the case as the expert would decide it. But,
to the contrary, the expert is just another witness. As the lay wit-
ness testifies to his observation and at times expresses his opinion
on matters involving no special expertise, so the expert witness
testifies to his observation and expresses his opinion on matters of
special expertise. If the expert's testimony is contradicted, the
jury must resolve a difficult problem of credibility. This is hardly
usurpation. And if the expert's testimony is uncontradicted, why
shouldn't the jury accept it as a guide to decision as it would the
testimony of any credible lay witness?
Earlier in this discussion, the reader was asked to assume that
the reliability problem was the only stumbling-block on the road to
admissibility. With the reliability problem put to one side, it is
now appropriate to discuss two other bases for objection: (1) that
the extra-judicial statement is self-serving; and (2) that the state-
ment is hearsay.' 7' That the statement is self-serving is true; were
it otherwise the defendant would not offer it into evidence. But that
the label "self-serving" warrants rejecting the evidence is another
matter. Assuredly the reason does not apply to intra-judicial, excul-
patory statements. If it did, the law of evidence would have
retrogressed to that unfelicitous time when the defendant was
incompetent to testify in his own behalf. 2 Regarding extra-judicial
statements, it must be admitted that, although some courts have
rejected the "self-serving" rule, others have not.Y3 The wise course,
however, has been charted by Professor McCormick: "Actually the
serum); Forkosch, "The Lie Detector and the Courts," 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 202, 221
(1939).
17' These arguments are found in Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th
Cir. 1956) (dictum) (truth serum; self-serving) ; People v. Cullen, supra note 169
(truth serum; self-serving, hearsay) ; People v. McNichol, 100 Cal. App. 2d 544, 234
P2d 21 (1950) (same) ; Dugan v. Commonwealth, mtpra note 170 (same) ; State v.
Hudson, 289 S.W. 920 (Mo. 1926) (truth serum; self-serving) ; Boeche v. State, 151
Neb. 363, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) (lie-detector; impairment of cross-examination);
State v. Lindemuth, supra note 168 (truth serum; self-serving, hearsay) ; Henderson
v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951) (lie-
detector; truth serum; impairment of cross-examination) ; Orange v. Commonwealth,
191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950) (truth serum; self-serving). It should be noted
that the hearsay argument will have but limited application to an intra-judicial state-
ment.
172 For the view that the "self-serving" rule was an adjunct of the defendant's
incompetency, see McCormick, Evidence §275, at 588 (1954).
173 See id. at 589 for a collection of the cases.
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appropriate rule for the exclusion of a party's declarations offered
in his own behalf as evidence of the truth of the facts declared is
the hearsay rule." '74 And it is to the hearsay rule that consideration
will now be given. Four arguments are generally urged in support
of the exclusion of hearsay statements: (1) the statements are not
attended by the solemnity of an oath; (2) the fact-finder is unable
to observe the demeanor of the out-of-court declarant; (3) the
witness may not accurately report the out-of-court declaration; and
(4) there is no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.'
Reduced to a common denominator, the problem is one of assumed
unreliability. Indeed, the various exceptions to the hearsay rule
derive from the counter-assumption of reliability.1'7 And it is this
same counter-assumption which underlies the argument in favor
of the admissibility of hypno-induced and related statements. Once
the proper foundation is established, in accordance with the pro-
cedure outlined in this article, the reasons in support of the hearsay
rule vanish. Consequently the hearsay rule should not be a bar to
admissibility.177
D. Admissibility, Over Objection, of Inculpatory Statements
Under Hypnosis.
Suppose that D is arrested and charged with murder. A pre-
liminary hearing results in his being bound over for indictment by
grand jury. Bail is denied and D is confined. During confinement,
D is interrogated by agents of the state while under hypnosis
induced by an expert medical hypnotist, and inculpatory statements
are obtained. Are these statements admissible in evidence? If not,
should they be? The answers to these questions will depend in
part upon whether the statements are voluntary or involuntary.
1. Voluntary, Inculpatory Statements.
No American cases have been found involving the admissibility
of statements made under hypnosis or narcosis voluntarily under-
gone.'78 However, lie-detector cases are available, and, as might be
174 Ibid. (footnotes omitted). For another rejection of the "self-serving" rule,
see Dession, "Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation," 62 Yale L.J. 313,
323 (1953).
175 McCormick, op. cit. supra note 172, §224; Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof
§214, at 426-27 (3rd ed. 1937).
176 Dession, supra note 174, at 325.
177 Ibid.
178 The French case of Gabrielle Bombard has already been commented upon.
See text to note 7, supra.
This discussion of voluntary statements will exclude case in which the defendant
confessed while intoxicated or while under the influence of drugs not considered to
be truth sera. For discussions of these cases, see Note, "Some Problems Relating to
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expected, the rule is one of inadmissibility. Although the rule has
been applied to grand jury proceedings, 1 9 the typical application
of the rule is at trial. If the trial court admits the results of a lie-
detector test as evidence of guilt, there is reversible error. 8 0 There
is also reversible error if a prosecution witness testifies that the
defendant took a lie-detector test, even though the results are not
specifically disclosed to the jury."8 The theory of these cases is that
the Admissibility of Drug Influenced Confessions," 24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 96 (1957) ;
Comment, "Admissibility of Confessions and Denials Made Under the Influence of
Drugs," 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 666 (1957). For a case in which a truth serum was
treated as an ordinary drug and a resulting confession was held reliable, voluntary,
and admissible, see People v. Townsend, 11 Ill. 2d 30, 141 N.E.2d 729, cert. denied,
355 U.S. 850 (1957). The case is discussed in Sheedy, "Narcointerrogation of a
Criminal Suspect," 50 J. Crim. L.,C&P.S. 118 (1959). For the habeas corpus sequel to
People v. Townsend, see Townsend v. Sain, 83 S.Ct. 745 (1963), discussed infra note
209.
179 People v. Dobler, 215 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Suffolk Co. Ct. 1961). In the Dobler
case, an indictment was dismissed because of testimony before the grand jury that the
accused had taken a lie-detector test and had been informed that the results were not
favorable. It was noted that under New York law a grand jury may receive only
legally admissible evidence.
180 State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947) ; State v. Trimble, 68 N.M.
406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961). In People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P2d 70
(1950), the examiner testified over objection that the defendant reacted to the murder
weapon, that the defendant was then asked for an explanation, and that he said that
he was unable to give an explanation. The trial court instructed the jury to disre-
gard the evidence that the defendant reacted to the murder weapon. On appeal the
conviction was reversed because of the lie-detector evidence. No weight was given to
the instruction.
181 People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957) (X, a suspect, testified
that he submitted to a lie-detector examination and intimated that D refused; X's
testimony was thereafter stricken; court still found that reversible error had been
committed); People v. Welke, 342 Mich. 164, 68 N.W2d 759 (1955) (examiner
testified that D took test and was thereafter told that he was lying) ; State v. Arnwine,
67 N.J. Super. 483, 171 A.2d 124 (1961) (examiner testified that defendant took test,
that defendant was advised of the results, and that defendant then confessed) ; State
v. Varos, 69 N.M. 19, 363 P.2d 629 (1961) (examiner testified that defendant took
test, that defendant then confessed, and that he (the examiner) had never been proved
wrong; conviction reversed even though defendant's attorney failed to object) ; State
v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E2d 169 (1961) (testimony indicated that defendant and
co-defendant took test and that co-defendant passed) ; State v. Smith, 113 Ohio App.
461, 178 N.E.2d 605 (1960) (prosecution witness testified that defendant took test but
that defendant did not know the results) ; Leeks v. State, 245 P.2d 764 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1952) (opinion does not disclose the substance of the testimony). Contra, People
v. Schiers, 160 Cal. App. 2d 364, 324 P.2d 981, hearing denied, per curiam, 329 P.2d
1 (1958) (witness testified unresponsively that defendant took test, was told he was
lying, was asked for an explanation, and stated that the lie-detector was wrong; trial
court instructed jury to disregard; court of appeals held error cured by instruction;
Judges Carter, Schauer, and Traynor vigorously dissented from supreme court's
refusal to grant hearing).
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the witness indirectly told the jury that the results were unfavorable
to the defendant. However, a peculiar problem exists in cases in
which the lie-detector test precedes a confession. In such cases the
prosecutor's dilemma is obvious: on the one hand, he may be
required to prove that the confession was voluntary; on the other
hand, he runs the risk of reversible error if, in proving the circum-
stances surrounding the confession, he suggests that the lie-detector
test indicated guilt. And the risk is a real one, at least in those cases
in which the evidence is received without an instruction that the
evidence be considered only on the question of voluntariness.8 2
But if the instruction is given, the cases generally hold that reversi-
ble error has not been committed,'8 3 and it may be inferred from one
case that the instruction is not even necessary. 84 Confession cases
aside, however, the general rule is still one of inadmissibility.
182 People v. Welke, supra note 181; State v. Arnwine, id; State v. Varos, id.
183 Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
908 (1952) ; People v. Schiers, supra note 181. But see People v. Wochnick, supra
note 180.
184 State v. Dehart, 242 Wis. 562, 8 N.W.2d 360 (1943). In evaluating the cases
cited in this note and in note 183, supra, the first question is whether the evidence is
relevant, and the answer must be yes. See Tyler v. United States, supra note 183.
The second question is whether the evidence is too relevant, that is, whether there is
a substantial risk that the jury overemphasized the evidence. The giving of a caution-
ary instruction may be of some help, but it does not necessarily resolve the problem.
But see Tyler v. United States, supra note 183. However, the question can be avoided.
It is not essential that the prosecutor's evidence of voluntariness contain specific
reference even to the fact that a lie-detector test was taken. State v. Varos, supra
note 181. If the test was taken, the defendant will, in all likelihood, so inform his
attorney. However, to cover the rare case in which the defendant "holds out," the
prosecutor could be required to ascertain that the defense counsel knows of the test.
The onus of the dilemma would then be transferred from prosecutor to defense coun-
sel, and there is every reason to believe that the latter would gladly accept it if it
gave him any reasonable opportunity to prove that the confession was coerced. For
cases involving successful and unsuccessful claims that a lie-detector examination was
part of coercive acts leading to a confession, see People v. Hills, 30 Cal. 2d 694, 185
P.2d 11 (1947) (confession admissible) ; Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P.2d
111 (1945) (confession inadmissible) ; People v. Lettrick, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E2d 488
(1952) (trial court improperly limited defendant's right to cross-examine lie-detector
operator regarding coercion); People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N.E2d 336 (1946)
(confession inadmissible) ; Pinter v. State, 203 Miss. 344, 34 So.2d 723 (1948) (con-
fession inadmissible); State v. Colett, 58 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio App. 1944), appeal
dismissed, 144 Ohio St. 639, 60 N.E.2d 170 (1945) (confession admissible) ; Common-
wealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A.2d 389 (1941) (confession admissible) ; Common-
wealth v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A.2d 353 (1939) (confession admissible) ; Prince v.
State, 231 S.W. 2d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950) (confession inadmissible); All of
these cases use the same point of departure: if the lie-detector is part of a coercive
scheme, the resulting confession is inadmissible; if the lie-detector is used as part of
a trick to induce a confession, the confession is admissible. For the view that the
same rules would apply in cases of narcosis, see Dession, supra note 174, at 333-34.
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The reasons tendered in support of the rule are the same as
those offered in cases involving exculpatory results: (1) prece-
dent; "' (2) lack of general scientific acceptance; 86 (3) lack of
general reliability; 8 7 (4) potential impact upon the jury;8 8  (5)
usurpation of the jury's fact-finding role;' s9 (6) distraction of the
jury; 190 and (7) impairment of cross-examination (hearsay)."" In
addition, two reasons have been advanced which are peculiar to
the case involving inculpatory results. The first is that the lie-
detector is offensive to the traditions of a free society. 92 This
reason for exclusion would have some weight if the question con-
cerned the admissibility of the results of a test forced upon the
defendant. However, if the test is voluntarily undergone, it is
difficult to perceive any offensive aspect. The second reason is that
the admissibility of inculpatory results would prohibit the accused
from making a "realistic defense." 113 The absurdity of this statement
is made patent when the reason is parried with, "A realistic defense
such as what? Lying?" 194
185 State v. Armwine, supra note 181; State v. Trimble, supra note 180. The case
typically relied upon is Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), in
which exculpatory results were excluded and the defendant was convicted. Thereafter,
it was learned that another person had committed the offense and that Frye's pro-
testations of innocence were true. See State v. Armwine, supra.
186 People v. Wochnick, supra note 180; People v. Foye, supra note 181.
187 People v. Carter, supra note 181; People v. Schiers, 329 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1958)
(dissenting opinion) ; State v. Lowry, supra note 180; State v. Arnwine, supra note
181; State v. Foye, supra note 181; State v. Smith, supra note 181; Leeks v. State,
supra note 181. In terms of these cases, the content of "unreliability" is (1) the fear
that a sensitive, innocent subject might be falsely accused by his own emotions, State
v. Lowry, supra note 180; (2) the fear that a hardened criminal might "beat" the
device, id.; (3) the fear that the jury would not be as able as the examiner to allow
for unreliability, id.; and (4) the realization that the expertise of the examiner is
crucial and that there are too few competent examiners, State v. Arnwine, supra
note 181.
188 People v. Schiers, supra note 187.
189 People v. Schiers, supra note 187; State v. Smith, supra note 181.
190 State v. Foye, supra note 181.
191 State v. Lowry, supra note 180; State v. Foye, supra note 181.
192 People v. Schiers, supra note 187. This reason was first explored in Silving,
"Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 683 (1956). Pro-
fessor Silving would, amazingly enough, bar the use of exculpatory results for the
same reason. Id. at 693.
193 People v. Schiers, supra note 187.
194 On the other hand, it must be admitted that, to a certain extent, lying is
encouraged by the way in which criminal law is administered. Take, for example, the
offense of perjury. If defendant is tried for some other offense and is convicted over
his plea of alibi, seldom is he subjected to a subsequent prosecution for perjury.
Failure to prosecute may be attributable to a number of factors. But one cannot, out
of hand, reject as a factor the notion that defendant should be permitted to lie in his
own defense.
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The lie-detector cases, considered above, indicate the likely
result in the analogous cases of hypnosis or narcosis. Voluntary,
inculpatory statements would be held inadmissible. The reasons in
support of the rule of inadmissibility are, of course, subject to the
same objection as has already been made in Part III C of this
article regarding exculpatory statements. If, in a given case, the
conditions of reliability have been met, the statements should be
admissible. Undoubtedly, the statements would be highly preju-
dicial as far as the defendant is concerned. But, as a prosecuting
attorney once observed, when the defense attorney objected to
evidence solely on the ground that it was prejudicial, "Indeed it
is prejudicial. That is precisely why I offer it." 3.5
The suggested rule of admissibility in cases involving incul-
patory statements should not be taken as a criticism of the results
of the decided cases. In these cases, even more than in cases of
exculpatory statements, there is a failure to prove that the condi-
tions of reliability were present. Consequently, inadmissibility was
properly determined. The suggested rule is, however, a criticism of
the reasoning of these cases, premised, as it is, upon standards
which probably can never be met.
2. Involuntary, Inculpatory Statements.
a. Statements induced by hypnosis.
Toward the end of the last century, a British legal periodical
recounted a proposal by Dutch authorities (the proposal was sub-
sequently abandoned) to hypnotize a murder suspect in order to
elicit clues. Had the suspect confessed, the confession would have
been inadmissible; however, derivative evidence would have been
admissible.' Should such a problem arise today in the United
States regarding hypnosis not submitted to as a matter of choice,
how would it be resolved? In answering this question, the assump-
tion will be made that reliability can be demonstrated either by
proof of the conditions of reliability or by proof of facts extrinsic to
the confession which corroborate the confession. 19 7 If the assump-
195 The story is not apocryphal. In my own trial experience I have been met
with precisely such a "scatter-shot" objection.
196 95 Law Times 500 (1893). See also 23 Wash. L. Rep. 534, 535 (1895).
197 It is interesting to note that in none of the cases already discussed has any
court even commented upon corroborating evidence as a basis for demonstrating the
reliability of the hypno-induced or narco-induced statement or the results of a lie-
detector test. The point is of particular importance in the case of the exculpatory
statement or result and in the case of the voluntary, inculpatory statement or result
because it demonstrates the blind attitude of the courts against admissibility. That
the corroboration approach was, and is, available to the courts is clear from its use,
under the common-law rule, as a basis for the admissibility of involuntary confessions.
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tion were not made, it would be necessary to assume unreliability,9 8
and that assumption would bar admissibility.
An attack on the admissibility of a hypno-induced confession,
unreliability aside, might be made either on due process grounds
or on grounds of self-incrimination. The relationship between state
and federal protections against self-incrimination has already been
considered in but a slightly different context and will form no part
of the present discussion. The problem will be explored from the
standpoint of the federal due process and self-incrimination pro-
visions, the former as it includes state cases, and the latter exclu-
sive of state cases.
With reference to due process, the specific question is whether
the confession is voluntary.'99 The answer of the commentators is
no,20 and the answer finds substantial support in the few hypnosis
cases in which the question was raised. In the Canadian case of
Rex v. Booker,20' the accused, while in jail, was visited several times
by a criminologist who claimed to practice hypnotism. After the
last visit the criminologist told the police that a confession would
be forthcoming. Shortly thereafter, the accused called for a detec-
tive and confessed. The confession was held inadmissible as
involuntary in the absence of proof that the accused did not confess
under post-hypnotic suggestion. In the American case of People v.
Leyra, °2 the defendant, suspected of murdering his parents, was
extensively interrogated by the police during a two-day period.
He made several incriminating admissions which fell far short of a
confession. Thereafter, and while he was suffering from the effects
of lack of sleep, he was interrogated by a psychiatrist who played
upon his fears and his exhaustion and who ultimately, through
See Maguire, "Involuntary Confessions," 31 Tul. L. Rev. 124, 130-31 (1956); Com-
ment, "Admissibility of Confessions and Denials Made Under the Influence of Drugs,"
52 Nw.U.L. Rev. 666, 675 n. 45 (1957).
198 For across-the-board arguments that hypno-induced confessions are unreliable,
see Bannister, "Hypnotic Influence in Criminal Cases," 51 Albany L. Rev. 87, 88
(1895); Levy, "Hypnosis and Legal Immutability," 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 333,
341 (1955) ; Ladd, "Legal Aspects of Hypnotism," 11 Yale L.J. 173, 188-89 (1902) ;
Note, "Hypnotism, Suggestibility and the Law," 31 Neb. L. Rev. 575, 591 (1952) ; 42
Harv. L. Rev. 704 (1929).
199 The transition in the Supreme Court cases from the test of reliability or
trustworthiness to the test of voluntariness is noted, with relevant citations, in Note,
"Some Problems Relating to the Admissibility of Drug Influenced Confessions," supra
note 178, at 99; Comment, "Admissibility of Confessions and Denials Made Under the
Influence of Drugs," supra note 197, at 675.
200 Levy, supra note 198, at 34143; Mueller, "The Law Relating to Police Inter-
rogation Privileges and Limitations," 52 J. Crim. L.,C.&P.S. 2, 11 (1961) ; Sudduth,
"Hypnotism and Crime," 13 Medico-Legal J. 239, 250-51 (1895).
201 4 D.L.R. 795 (Sup. Ct. Alta. 1928).
202 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E. 2d 553 (1951).
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suggestion, wheedling, and promises, obtained a confession. This
interrogation, fortunately for the defendant, was tape recorded by
the police. After the confession, the defendant made other con-
fessions to his business partner, a detective, and members of the
prosecutor's staff. At trial, the confessions were admitted into
evidence over the objection that the confession to the psychiatrist
was induced by hypnosis. The defendant was convicted, he ap-
pealed, and the New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction
on the ground that the first confession was a product of mental
coercion and was, therefore, involuntary. However, the court ex-
pressly declined to state that the confession was a product of
hypnosis because that issue had been submitted to the jury, and
the jury had resolved it against the defendant. Leyra was retried
and was again convicted, this time on the strength of the subse-
quent confessions. The conviction was affirmed.0 3 Thereafter, he
petitioned the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus, and,
in the Supreme Court, he ultimately prevailed.2 0 4  The limited
holding was that the subsequent confessions were, as a matter of
law, products of the inadmissible confession to the psychiatrist.
However, the following statement by Mr. Justice Black is worthy
of note:
First, an already physically and emotionally exhausted suspect's
ability to resist interrogation was broken to almost trance-like
submission by the use of the arts of a highly skilled psychiatrist.
Then the confession petitioner began making was filled in and
perfected by additional statements given in rapid succession to a
police officer, a trusted friend, and two state prosecutors. We
hold that use of confessions extracted in such a manner from a
lone defendant unprotected by counsel is not consistent with due
process of law as required by our Constitution.2 0 5 (Emphasis
added.)
From this quotation, it may be argued that hypno-induced con-
fessions are involuntary and inadmissible as violative of due process.
And the argument is all the more persuasive in the light of an
appendix to the Court's opinion containing extensive extracts from
the tape-recorded interrogation.206 These extracts indicate that
although hypnosis might not have been involved in Leyra (the
psychiatrist testified that it was not), hypnotic techniques were
employed and did lead to the confession. On the other hand, neither
Leyra nor any other Supreme Court case singles out a particular
203 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E. 2d 673, cert. denied, 345 U. S. 918 (1952).
204 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
205 347 U.S. at 561.
206 347 U.S. at 562-84.
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fact as crucial. °7 The inquiry is based on the totality of the facts,
and, as in Leyra, inadmissibility is based on a concatenation of
events indicative of overreaching, unfairness, and non-physical bru-
tality.208 Thus, the argument that hypnosis per se is a basis for
inadmissibility requires a refinement of existing case law. But the
refinement is not unwarranted. In the first place, it comports with
the commonly understood definition of "involuntary" as "lacking
will or the power to choose." 209 Certainly a hypno-induced con-
fession is the product of suggestion exerted during the hypnotic
relationship rather than a product of conscious choice. Secondly,
the refinement is consonant with such recent developments as Mapp
v. Ohio 21 in which "privacy" was postulated as a concept under-
lying due process and warranting the exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of the concept.211 Here, of course, it is necessary to
analogize the privacy of thoughts to the privacy or security of an
abode. But the analogy is not difficult. In this regard, the dissent-
ing opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 12
already referred to, is pertinent. After stating his position that the
constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure
should be interpreted broadly to encompass newly conceived scien-
tific devices, he observed:
Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of
exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. "That
places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer"
was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these. To
Lord Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed "subversive of all the
comforts of society." Can it be said that the Constitution affords
no protection against such invasions of individual security? 213
The conclusion that a hypo-induced confession is involuntary
and inadmissible as a violation of due process if the hypnosis is not
submitted to as a matter of choice does not necessarily answer the
207 But see Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), a case which may turn
upon the fact that the defendant was but 14 years old.
208 See, for example, Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) ; Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49 (1949).
209 Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary 1290 (1957). After the text to
footnotes 207-09 was written, the Supreme Court held in Townsend v. Sain, 83 S.Ct.
745, 754 (1963) that, "it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the confession
would be less the product of a free intellect, less voluntary, than when brought about
by a drug having the effect of a 'truth serum.'
210 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
211 See also, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949): "[W]e have no hesitation
in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy
it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment."
212 277 U.S. 438 (1923).
213 277 U.S. at 474 (footnotes omitted).
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question of whether the confession also violates the privilege against
self-incrimination. On the basis of some statements in case law,
there is reason to suspect that the privilege has been accorded an
interpretation broad enough to encompass the hypno-induced con-
fession. As Professor McCormick has observed:
... there is an insistent recurrence in the decisions on confessions
of language which savors of privilege. Thus most courts, as a
shorthand expression customarily say that the confession, to be
admitted, must have been "voluntary." . . . It may well be that
the adherence of the courts to this form of statement of the
confession-rule in terms of "voluntariness" is prompted not only
by a liking for its convenient brevity, but also by a recognition
that there is an interest here to be protected closely akin to the
interest of a witness or of an accused person which is protected
by the privilege against compulsory self-crimination. 214
On the other hand, it is clear that the confession rule and the
privilege differ in origin and scope,215 and it is indicated in some
federal and state cases that the privilege was not intended to apply
to police interrogation for the reason that "since police have no
legal right to compel answers, there is no legal obligation to which
a privilege in the technical sense can apply." 216
But whether or not the privilege applies, the confession rule
can still be relied upon as a basis for inadmissibility.
b. Statements induced by narcosis.
217
The conclusion that hypno-induced statements are inadmissible
if hypnosis is forced upon the subject is firmly supported by case-
law 2 18 and comment 219 involving the parallel narcosis problem.
220
214 McCormick, "The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence," 16 Texas L.
Rev. 447, 452-53 (1938). For cases in which due process and self-incrimination are
specifically referred to as bases for inadmissibility, see Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 83 S. Ct. 448, 453 (1963) ; United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951);
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
215 See VIII Wigmore, Evidence § 2266 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
216 Id. §2252, at 329n. 27. The cited work contains reference to state and
federal cases.
217 Excluded from consideration is the case in which the prosecutor argues that
the defendant's failure or refusal to submit to interrogation under narcosis gives rise
to an inference of guilt. The argument has been held improper on the theory that
narco-induced statements are inadmissible as unreliable. State v. Levitt, 36 N.J. 266,
176 A.2d 465 (1961). But see People v. Draper, 304 N.Y. 799, 109 N.E2d 342
(1952); Draper v. Denno, 113 F. Supp. 290, 293 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 205 F.2d 570
(2d Cir. 1953) (argument not objected to; error, if any, did not have constitutional
stature).
218 Townsend v. Sain, supra note 209; People v. Heirens, 4 Ill. 2d 131, 122 N.E.
2d 231 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955) (dictum).
219 Despres, "Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements," 14 U. Chi. L. Rev.
601, 605 (1947) ; Dession, "Drug Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation," 62
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c. Forceful use of the lie-detector.
In 1957, the American Academy of Polygraph Examiners
adopted as a statement of principle that ". . . a polygraph examina-
tion is, and must be by its very nature, a voluntary act by the
person taking the examination." 221 Implicit in this statement is the
recognition that force may impair reliability. Hence, force would
serve as an evidentiary reason for inadmissibility. Suppose, however,
that force and reliability are assumed. Would the results be inad-
missible for reasons of constitutional dimension? The question, it
must be stressed, is not whether a subsequent confession would be
admissible. That question has already been considered.222 The
specific question is whether the test results would be admissible.
Yale L.J. 315, 333-37 (1953); Sheedy, "Narcointerrogation of a Criminal Suspect,"
50 J. Crim. L., C.&P.S. 118, 123 (1959). The issues are, of course, the same as in
hypnosis cases: self-incrimination and due process. In the narcosis case, however, there
is an added due-process factor in that physical force must be used upon the defendant.
Thus, in the narcosis case there is a basis for bringing into play the test, announced
in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), of whether the conduct shocks the
conscience and runs counter to civilized standards. This basis may be present in the
case of hypnosis, but it is more tenuous.
220 In People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E.2d 925 (1942), it was held that
the defendants' constitutional rights were not violated by the use of truth serum to
ascertain mental condition, an issue raised by the defendants' pleas of insanity at the
time of the act and at the time of the trial. There is no indication in the opinion that
the narcosis was not submitted to voluntarily. Apparently it was the defendants'
position that voluntary submission to narcosis resulted in involuntary statements and
that the latter involition had constitutional significance. In dictum, it was indicated
that, assuming no voluntary submission, the use of narco-obtained evidence on the
question of insanity at the time of trial raised no problem of self-incrimination.
Whether this statement would apply with reference to the issue of insanity at the
time of the act was not discussed. Also not discussed was the due process problem.
For an argument that due process compels inadmissibility even in the insanity case,
see Comment, "Admissibility of Confessions and Denials Made Under the Influence of
Drugs," 52 Nw. U. L. Rev. 666, 679 (1957).
One medical aspect of narcosis, particularly relevant to a discussion of due process,
is that scopolamine may produce retrograde amnesia regarding the interrogation.
Muehlberger, "Interrogation Under Drug Influence," 42 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 513, 520
(1951). The same is true of hypnosis, Bell, "Hypnotism and the Law," 13 Medico-
Legal J. 47, 49-50 (1895), but memory may be revived by subsequent hypnosis. Allen,
"Hypnotism and its Legal Import," 12 Can. B. Rev. 14, 18 (1934). Thus, the subject
may be at the mercy of his interrogator and may find that he is unable to dispute
answers or statements attributed to him. Protection might be afforded by the presence
of counsel at the interrogation, but, under current case-law, the presence of counsel
is not a constitutional requirement, Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958);
Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958), at least prior to indictment. See Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
221 "Statement of Principles Regarding Polygraph ('Lie-Detector') Examina-
tions," 48 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 568, 569 (1958).
222 See cases cited in note 184, supra.
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From the standpoint of fifth or fourteenth amendment due
process, it is relevant to note that the problem under consideration
involves force sufficient to hold the subject in place while the va-
rious~parts of the lie-detector mechanism are attached to him. The
force, however, is minimal and it is therefore difficult to predicate
any argument upon the existence of brutal misconduct 223 More-
over, force is not the factor which motivates disclosure as it does
in the typical coerced confession case. Nevertheless, the subject,
not as a matter of choice, is placed in a situation in which incrimi-
natory responses are elicited from him, again not as a matter of
choice. If the testimonial responses obtained by hypnosis or narcosis
are involuntary, it would seem that the physiological responses
adduced by the lie-detector interrogation are also involuntary, and
that the interrogation constitutes as grave an incursion into the
privacy of thoughts as do hypnosis and narcosis. Thus, an argument
is available that due process is violated by the forcible use of a
lie-detector.
As might be expected, there is a paucity of case law. In two
cases the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the use of a lie-detector
without the subject's consent is improper, but neither case involved
the admissibility of the results.22 4 A problem of admissibility was
involved in the California case of People v. Schiers.21 5 At the close of
the prosecution's case, a police witness, in an unresponsive answer,
stated that the defendant voluntarily took a lie-detector test, felt
that the test was fair, was told that he was lying, was asked if he
could give an explanation, and replied that the device was wrong.
Thereafter, the jury was instructed to disregard all testimony about
the lie-detector. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court held
that the instruction cured the error, and the California Supreme
Court declined to hear a further appeal. However, in a dissenting
opinion by Justice Carter certain aspects of constitutionality were
considered. Using (perhaps "misusing" would be more accurate)
223 See Rochin v. California, supra note 219.
224 In People v. Heirens, supra note 218, the court characterized as a flagrant
violation of due process the unauthorized search of the defendant's abode, prolonged
questioning of the defendant, use of narcosis, and use of a lie-detector. However, the
defendant pleaded guilty and it was held that the proscribed practices did not induce the
plea. In People v. Simms, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N.E.2d 336 (1946), the court held that the
police could not force a suspect to take a lie-detector test and that a subsequent con-
fession was inadmissible. See also State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 192, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945),
in which the defendant moved that all witnesses be compelled to take a lie-detector
test. The motion was denied and the decision was affirmed primarily on the ground of
unreliability. However, in a dictum it was indicated that it would be improper to
subject persons to a lie-detector test without their consent.
225 160 Cal. App. 2d 364, 324 P.2d 981, hearing denied per curiam 329 P2d 1
(1958).
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the stomach-pump case of RocLin v. California 22 1 as a wedge,
Justice Carter found the following to be shocking misconduct on the
part of the state: that the defendant was told that lie-detector tests
were accurate; that the police witness gave the impression that the
defendant lied, although the results of the test were not introduced;
that no expert testified regarding any precautions taken to insure
accuracy; and that no expert testified regarding the interpretation
of the results. Beyond question, Justice Carter was correct in his
insistence that error had been committed because there was no
proof of reliability. That the error was incurable is an entirely
different proposition, and one which strikes at the very heart of
the assumed efficacy of curative instructions. But for purposes of
this discussion, the signal aspect of the dissenting opinion is the due
process dimension ascribed to the error in spite of the fact that
Schiers consented to the test. Although one may indeed question
whether Schiers was deprived of due process, the dissenting opinion
does support the conclusion inferable from the Illinois cases that
the administration of a lie-detector test by force is a violation of
fifth and fourteenth amendment due process.
As noted above in connection with hypno-induced confessions,
the due process problem is easier to resolve than is the self-
incrimination problem. With reference to lie-detector results, the lat-
ter problem is even more complicated because of the rule that the
privilege applies only to testimonial utterances. Can it be said
that the subject's physiological reactions are testimonial in nature?
To most commentators, a negative answer is required by analogy
to those cases in which an accused may be compelled to submit to
fingerprinting or an examination of his body or body fluids, or to
speak or write or give some physical demonstration for purposes
of identification. 21 But the analogy is superficial and it obliterates
any doctrinal consideration of the requirement of testimonial com-
pulsion. What is necessary is an intelligent analysis, and Dean
Wigmore has accomplished it:
Unless some attempt is made to secure a communication-
written, oral or otherwise-upon which reliance is to be placed
as involving his consciousness of the facts and the operations of
his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him is not a
testimonial one.2 2 8
Under this analysis, although testimonial compulsion would be
228 Supra note 219.
227 Hardman, "Lie Detectors, Extrajudicial Investigations and the Courts," 48
W. Va. L. Rev. 37, 39 (1941) ; Note, 29 Cornell L.Q. 535 (1944) ; Note 44 Harv. L.
Rev. 842 (1931).
228 VIII Wigmore, Evidence § 2265, at 386 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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absent in the fingerprint case, it would be present in the lie-detector
case because the physiological reactions are predicated upon the
subject's consciousness of facts and because the purpose of the
interrogation is to elicit the reactions.229 But even if testimonial
compulsion is present, the question still remains whether the privi-
lege applies to police interrogations, and, as indicated above, the
answer is in doubt.
d. Derivative evidence.
Suppose that D is suspected of murder. The police, without
probable cause, enter D's house, conduct a general search, and find
a diary in which D admits that he killed the deceased and that he
buried his own blood-spattered clothes and the murder weapon,
a hammer, in his basement. Thereafter, the police find the clothes
and the hammer, and analysis discloses D's fingerprints on the
hammer. In a federal court, the diary would be inadmissible as the
product of an unreasonable search, and the clothes and hammer
would be inadmissible as derivative evidence or fruit of the poisoned
tree.2 30 In a state court, the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause would, under Mapp v. Ohio,23' bar admissibility of the diary
and, although the matter is not clear, arguably Mapp would also
bar admissibility of the derivative evidence. 32
Suppose, however, that hypnosis or narcosis is used in lieu of
a search, that D reveals under hypnosis or narcosis the location of
the clothes and hammer, and that the clothes and hammer are sub-
sequently found. The statements made by D are, as indicated
above, inadmissible as involuntary. But what of the derivative
evidence? By analogy to the search cases, it might be expected that
an exclusionary rule applies, but the expectation is groundless in
229 Dean Wigmore (perhaps Professor McNaughton) is reluctant to come out
foursquare in favor of this result. His hedging conclusion is that the lie-detector case
"is not far logically and intuitively from those cases in which the suspect is compelled
to make an incriminating communication of knowledge-a compulsion proscribed by
the privilege." Id. § 2265, at 400.
The only case remotely in point is People v. Schiers, supra note 225, in which
Judge Carter, dissenting, finds testimonial compulsion to be present.
230 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) ; Silverthorne Lumber Com-
pany v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
231 Supra note 210.
232 For a tacit assumption that Mapp embodies the derivative evidence rule, see
Day & Berkman, "Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary Rule: A Re-Examination
in the Wake of Mapp v. Ohio," 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 56, 74, 96-98 (1961). For a
prediction that Mapp will be so interpreted, see Allen, "The Exclusionary Rule in the
American Law of Search and Seizure," 52 J. Crim. L., C.&P.S. 246, 254 (1961).
Professor Allen's prediction recently came to fruition in People v. Rodriguez, 11
N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651 (1962), in which the derivative evidence was a confession.
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terms of state case law 23 and the Supreme Court has apparently
never considered the point. Wigmore dismisses the point brusquely:
It was once contended that the impropriety of the inducement to
the confession tainted the facts discovered in consequence of it,
and that they also, as well as the confession, should remain inad-
missible. Such a doctrine needs only to be stated to expose its
equal lack of logic, principle, and expediency.23 4
The asserted illogic, lack of principle, and inexpediency are under-
standable only if consideration is given to the origin of the
confession rule. The rule barring improperly obtained confessions
was, at common law and in the early constitutional cases, premised
upon the reasonable assumption of unreliability,23' and trustworthi-
ness was the criterion of admissibility. If real evidence could be
derived from the confession, the confession was pro tanto shown
to be reliable. Not only was the evidence admissible, the confession
either entirely or in corroborated part was in many jurisdictions also
admissible.23 0 However, in the past 25 years the basis for the rule
has shifted from trustworthiness to a concept of volition rooted in
fair play. Thus, in Lisenba v. California,23' 7 it was stated that "the
aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presump-
tively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the
use of evidence, whether true or false." 238 Presumably this shift
has been motivated by a desire to make it unprofitable for agents
of the state to engage in unconscionable conduct,2 39 a desire which
also underlies the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases.240
And, if this is the rationale of the more recent cases, it is difficult
to carve out an exception for evidence derived from the confession.
To paraphrase Dean Wigmore, such an exception needs only to be
stated "to expose its equal lack of logic, principle, and expediency."
One may, therefore, predict that in due time an exclusionary rule
will be applied to evidence derived from an involuntary confession.
E. Admissibility on Stipulation of Hypno-Induced Statements.
No cases have been found involving the question of whether
a court will or should recognize a stipulation as to the admissibility
233 Cases are collected in 3 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 358 (12th ed. 1955).
For a recent case in which it was held that derivative evidence was inadmissible,
see People v. Ditson, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714 (Cal. 1962), noted in 50 Calif.
L. Rev. 723 (1962).
234 111 Wigmore, Evidence § 859 (3rd ed. 1940).
235 Id. §§ 822, 826.
23G See State v. Cocklin, 109 Vt. 207, 194 Atl. 378 (1937).
237 314 U.S. 219 (1931).
238 Id. at 236.
239 See Mueller, supra note 200, at 2, 4-5.
240 See Allen, supra note 232, at 247 n. 7, 251.
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of hypno-induced statements. The issue was not decided in State
v. Nebb because that case involved only the prosecutor's discretion
and not the presentation of hypno-induced statements to the jury.
However, a helpful analogy may be drawn between the hypnosis
problem and the problem of lie-detector and truth serum.
Initially, it must be recognized that if the stipulation is to be
effective under any circumstances, it must relate to admissibility
rather than solely to the administration of the test. In Orange v.
Commonwealt, 2 14 the prosecution agreed to a narco-interrogation
of the defendant but the agreement did not include a stipulation of
admissibility. The narco-induced statements were excluded from
evidence and the exclusion was affirmed on appeal.
If the stipulation relates to admissibility, it is likely that the
stipulation will be given effect. In the earlier cases there was a
decided split of authority, some cases sustaining the stipulation 242
and other cases rejecting it.243 However, in the more recent cases
there can be discerned a trend toward giving effect to the stipula-
tion.244 The most comprehensive treatment of the problem is to be
found in the recent lie-detector case of State v. Valdez 24' in which
the Arizona Supreme Court adhered to the general rule of inadmis-
sibility in the absence of stipulation, but recognized the efficacy of
a stipulation upon the following conditions: (1) that the stipulation
relate to admissibility; (2) that the trial judge have discretion to
exclude the evidence if it appears that factors of unreliability are
present; (3) that the opposing party be permitted a full and fair
cross-examination of the expert witness; (4) that the jury be
instructed that unfavorable results are not proof of any element of
the offense but relate only to the defendant's belief at the time of
the examination; and (5) that the jury be instructed that the
weight to be accorded the evidence is a matter for jury consideration.
Given these conditions, the stipulation has the effect of avoiding the
general rule that the evidence is inadmissible as unreliable. Indeed,
in these conditions are the seeds of the arguments advanced in this
article against the general rule of inadmissibility and in favor of a
241 191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950). For a sample stipulation form, see Inbau,
Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 135 (3d ed. 1953).
242 People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.?d 937 (1948) ; State v. Lowry,
163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947) (dictum) ; Orange v. Commonwealth, supra note
241 (dictum).
243 Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951) (civil case) ; LeFevre v.
State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943).
244 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962) ; State v. McNamara, 252
Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960). Contra, State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P2d
788 (1961).
245 Supra note 244. The case is commented upon in 5 Ariz. L. Rev. 76 (1963).
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rule of admissibility governed by an evaluation of the proof of
criteria of reliability in the particular case. Valdez is a step in the
right direction. The next step is to discard the general rule of
inadmissibility and to shift the conditions from the context of
stipulation to the context of a rule permitting admission of the
evidence.
F. The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements on the Issue of Sanity.
Although the use of hypnosis in psychiatric techniques is far
from widespread, the psychiatrist who engages in hypnosis is hardly
a maverick. Reputable psychiatrists do use hypnosis, 46 and the
technique has received the approval of the American Medical As-
sociation 47 What, then, should be the status of the testimony of
a psychiatrist regarding the mental condition of an accused if the
testimony rests in some part on hypno-induced statements? Two
separate problems are presented: hypnosis leading to proffered
testimony of sanity and hypnosis leading to proffered testimony of
insanity. If these problems are approached in accordance with the
suggestions already made in this article, the answer to the above
question is that the testimony should be admissible. What is at
stake in the insanity case is the predicate for the doctor's diagnosis.
Presumably the doctor, an expert, has taken into account the
various factors which may influence the reliability of the predicate
and has balanced them intelligently in arriving at his diagnosis.
And, because the issue of insanity is one that is typically committed
to the testimony of experts, the possible "usurpation" of the jury
function is tolerated. These arguments are equally weighty when
considered in the context of the prevailing rule of inadmissibility
(unreliability) insofar as statements on the merits are concerned,
and the discussion herein will be devoted exclusively to that
consideration.2 48
The hypnosis cases are so few in number and so meager in
analysis that discussion of them in vacuo is meaningless. Conse-
quently, attention will first be given to the relatively advanced
246 For an explanation of the use of hypnosis in psychiatry see Schneck, "Hypno-
sis in Psychiatry," in Hypnosis in Modem Medicine 143 (1959).
247 Bryan, Legal Aspects of Hypnosis 33 (1962).
248 Consideration will not be given to the voluntary-involuntary dichotomy under
this heading. The privilege against self-incrimination is generally regarded as inappli-
cable to the issue of sanity, VIII Wigmore, Evidence § 2265, at 399 (McNaughton
rev. 1961), and a due process argument is weakened by the fact that the issue arises
as a result of the defendant's own plea of insanity.
Nor will consideration be given to such possible objections as the hearsay rule
or the physician-patient privilege. For a clear indication that these objections have
not proved insuperable in narcosis cases, see Dession, supra note 219, at 315, 323-25.
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development of the related narcosis problem. The general rule of
inadmissibility is well entrenched in narcosis cases. Nevertheless,
courts usually have found the rule no barrier if the issue concerns
sanity, and the expert's testimony has been held admissible whether
in favor of the accused 249 or against him. 250 Although the bugaboo
of unreliability has been raised by counsel in these cases, it has
been dismissed with the observation that the use of narco-analysis
is recognized as a part of the psychiatric evaluative judgment, and
that the expert should be permitted to testify on the basis of the
information made available to him and used by him in reaching a
conclusion as to the accused's mental condition.2 5 Why this same
reasoning in support of reliability is not applicable when the issue is
the admissibility on the merits of a narco-induced statement is
never discussed in the cases. Like Topsy, it would appear, these
divergent approaches have grown, unimpeded by intelligent cross-
fertilization. Similarly, objections based on the hearsay rule have
received (and deservedly so) judicial short shrift when the issue
concerns mental condition. Typically it is said that the narco-
induced predicate for the expert's opinion is offered not for the
truth of the matters contained therein but merely for a predicative
purpose. 52 But courts never consider that this purpose may en-
compass an evaluation by the expert of the credibility of the
predicate, an evaluation which is tacitly passed on to the fact-finder.
In short, most courts live in two different worlds in narcosis
cases depending upon whether the issue concerns the admissibility
of narco-induced statements on the merits or the admissibility of
narco-induced statements as a predicate for expert opinion of men-
tal condition. Why this should be so is not easy to explain. One
possible answer has already been suggested. The issue of mental
249 People v. Cartier, 51 Cal. Zd 590, 335 P.2d 114 (1959). Contra, People v.
Ford, 304 N.Y. 479, 107 N.E.2d 595 (1952).
250 People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E.2d 925 (1942); Brown v. State,
304 P.2d 361 (Okla. Grim. 1956). See also People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P2d
38 (1954), in which it was held that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony
of a psychiatrist, based on a sodium pentothal interview, that the accused did not
possess the characteristics of a sex deviate ascribed to him by an accusation of lewd
conduct with a child. Contra, State v. Sinnott, 43 N.J. Super. 1, 127 A.2d 424 (1956).
For discussions of the problem raised by Jones and Sinott, see Falknor & Steffen,
"Evidence of Character: From the 'Crucible of the Community' to the 'Couch of the
Psychiatrist,'" 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 980 (1954) (attacking Jones) ; Curran, "Expert
Psychiatric Evidence of Personality Traits," 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 995 (1955) (attack-
ing Falknor & Steffen).
251 People v. Esposito, supra note 250; Brown v. State, supra note 250. In State
v. Sinnott, supra note 250, a "personality trait" case, exclusion was grounded on
unreliability coupled with all of the fears usually expressed in cases involving admissi-
bility on the merits of narco-induced statements.
252 People v. Cartier, supra note 249; Dession, supra note 219, at 324.
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condition cries out for expert assistance. Because the expert is all-
important, the rules are fashioned to facilitate his task and to
make open in the courtroom those processes practiced by him in
his office. But the issue of credibility on the merits has traditionally
been entrusted to the jury. The jury has, therefore, become a sacred
cow whose ruminations are protected against encroachment by the
imposition of rules demanding an impossible standard of certainty.
With the narcosis problem in the background, consideration
may now be given to the problem of hypnosis as related to mental
condition. The leading case (indeed, the only reported case) is the
California decision of People v. BusCh.2 3  The defendant was
charged with three counts of murder and one count of assault with
intent to commit murder. His defense was partial insanity, and it
was supported by the testimony of a psychologist and a psychiatrist.
To this testimony the defendant sought to add the testimony of
one Dr. Bryan, a general practitioner, who, less than a year before
the trial, began to specialize in the use of hypnosis. From the
proffered testimony of Dr. Bryan it was clear that he had examined
the defendant extensively through hypnosis and that in his opinion
the defendant was incapable of deliberation, premeditation, and
intention to kill. The proffered testimony was objected to on three
grounds: unreliability of hypno-induced statements as a basis for
opinion as to mental condition, lack of expert qualifications, and
hearsay. The objection was sustained, defendant was convicted on
all counts, and he appealed contending, inter alia, that the court
erred in excluding Dr. Bryan's testimony. However, the decision
was affirmed. One ground for the affirmance, beyond attack in this
article, was that Dr. Bryan was not sufficiently qualified. The other
ground was unreliability.
In laying a foundation for the introduction of opinion evidence of
the state of mind of a defendant based upon the use of a technique
not theretofore recognized by the courts as sufficiently reliable to
form the basis for such an opinion, at the very least, some showing
of its successful use in the examination of others than the defend-
ant for the same purpose, either by the witness or by other
experts in the field, would appear to be required. We are per-
suaded that under the circumstances herein narrated the trialjudge did not act unreasonably in his determination that a proper
foundation was not established as to the reliability of an analytical
tool still seeking recognition in the field of psychiatry.... 254
253 56 Cal. 2d 868, 366 P.2d 314 (1961). See also the unreported New York case
of People v. Smith (1933), referred to in Allen, "Hypnotism and its Legal Import," 12
Can. B. Rev. 80, 91n. 34a (1934). In the Smith case, hypno-induced testimony was
used to establish insanity at a pre-trial insanity hearing.
254 56 Cal. 2d at 878, 466 P2d at 319-20.
1964]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The meaning of the quoted passage is disturbingly vague. First,
note the reference to "a technique not theretofore recognized by
the courts as *sufficiently reliable to form the basis for such an
opinion." If, by this reference, the court intended to assimilate to
the general run of hypnosis cases the hypnosis-insanity problem,
the court misconceived its approach as is amply demonstrated by
the narcosis cases, two of them California decisions. 55 If, on the
other hand, the court intended to stress the absence of precedent
for admitting expert opinion based on hypno-induced statements,
it should have noted that Bwsclk was a case of first impression, that
there was also no precedent for exclusion, and that the analogous
narcosis cases favored admissibility. In view of this last fact, it
seems appropriate to place upon the court's statement an interpre-
tation against reliability even in the context of the insanity problem.
This interpretation is buttressed by the court's impossible demand
for "some showing of its successful [how can this ever be shown?]
use in the examination of others." Ultimately, however, the case
may rest upon the court's finding "that a proper foundation was
not established as to the reliability of an analytical tool still seeking
recognition in the field of psychiatry." If this means only that the
defense attorney failed to show that hypnosis is used by a reason-
able percentage of reputable psychiatrists, the decision cannot be
criticized. But if the reference means that foundation evidence is
insufficient unless it demonstrates that most psychiatrists use hyp-
nosis, the court has indeed struck a blow against scientific methods
of proof including previously sanctioned narcosis.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
The general rule of inadmissibility applied in cases of inculpa-
tory and exculpatory statements is inflexible and unrealistic. The
requirements of general acceptance and high reliability do not
prevail with reference to lay testimony, yet are used to frustrate
the testimony of experts. The suggestions contained in this article
for a case-by-case approach to the problem of admissibility, an
approach premised on proof of established criteria rather than on
assumptions of unreliability and fears of jury-function usurpation,
find support in the stipulation and sanity cases. The suggestions
are not intended as a cure-all. It may well be that proof of criteria
of reliability will in many cases be difficult. It may well be that the
suggestions will result in a rule of limited practical application. But,
at least at the verbal level, law ought to keep in step with related
disciplines, and the rules should facilitate rather than frustrate the
law's ability to take advantage of scientific developments.
255 People v. Cartier, supra note 249; People v. Jones, mipra note 250.
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Dean Wigmore has stated that "if there is ever devised a
psychological test for the valuation of witnesses, the law will run
to meet it." 251 More to the point, however, is the statement of the
New Jersey court in State v. Sinnott:
The specialty of psychiatry has developed with the increasing
knowledge of mental mechanisms, maladjustments, and the causa-
tions of human behavior, normal and abnormal. Perhaps it may
be said with some measure of truth that over a period of years
the law has lagged watchfully, inquisitively, maybe critically
behind an adaptable recognition of the progress being attained in
psychiatry. It is, however, a natural characteristic of the law,
resting as it does on established precedents and attitudes that
have received general acceptance, to follow rather than lead in
the initial introduction of probationary advances of science.257
It can hardly be disputed that caution is a desirable attribute
of any discipline that seeks to effect cures or to probe thoughts or
to resolve disputes through the imposition of sanctions. But that
law should, in the formulation of its rules, impede communication
with related discipline is disputable. Law, like the traveller,
purports to be ready for the morrow.28  But, unless inordinate,
precedent-oriented caution is dissipated, it may be found, too late,
that the morrow was yesterday.
266 111 Wigrnore, Evidence § 875, at 368 (3rd ed. 1940).
257 43 N.J. Super. at 8-9, 127 A.2d at 428 (1956).
258 See Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 20 (1924).
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